Afghanistan Divided between NATO and the US

Christoph Bertram, the former head of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, finds the unrealistic nature of German policy astonishing. "If the key ally changes its strategy, we will not be able to continue operating in the north as we have done so far, just because it suits our vision," says Bertram.

But it's not just that the Germans may have to increase their commitment in order to save the Afghanistan campaign. The German government will also have to prepare the public for the idea that all of the ambitious plans it had for Afghanistan may not come to fruition.

Under Obama, the Americans will focus on fighting the insurgents and al-Qaida. According to expert Bertram, the new American strategy can be summarized as: "more combat, less democracy."

This is a bitter pill for Germany to swallow. To drum up a majority for the Afghanistan mission in the German parliament, the Bundestag, in December 2001, the government of former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised what amounted to a new Afghanistan: a country in which children attend school once again, women no longer wear the burka and minorities are protected -- a country with electricity, running water and free elections. All of it, the message seemed to be, could be had for the price of a few million euros in development aid and what was then a force of only a few hundred soldiers.

Time to Abandon Utopia

The mission, as is now clear to everyone, has since developed into a dangerous, large-scale operation. But Berlin still struggles with the truth about the imminent failure of a nation building policy in Afghanistan.

The experts advising the German government are more pragmatic in this respect. According to a study by the Foundation of Science and Politics, the international community must "abandon its long-term utopian goal of a liberal market democracy in Afghanistan and get used to the solidification of an Afghan-style system of rule."

NATO in Afghanistan.

German diplomats admit that it may be necessary to settle for an unstable tribal state or even a moderate military dictatorship, and to accept that Islamic law could destroy emancipatory progress in cities like Kabul, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. They conclude that the key objective in the future will likely be to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a "safe haven" for terrorists who threaten the West.

Particularly unpleasant will be recognizing and correcting the central error in Afghanistan: the isolation of the Taliban. In 2001, the Americans and the Germans believed that the holy warriors would disappear after they were ousted from power. It is clear today that this was naïve.

President Barack Obama this weekend spoke of his plan to negotiate with moderate Islamists in Afghanistan. Speaking to the New York Times, Obama admitted that the war was not being won. There are those in Germany as well who have advocated a similar approach. The SPD's foreign policy expert, Niels Annen, for example, advocates the "inclusion of tribal leaders and the Taliban," even if it means having to pay a "potentially unpleasant price." FDP politician Hoyer admits, "we will not eliminate Sharia and the tribal traditions." More democracy would be nice, Hoyer adds, but greater stability is more important at the moment.

How Much Democracy?

The German government is still avoiding similarly clear language. Foreign Minister Steinmeier seems to be speaking in code when addressing these issues. Afghanistan, he says, is certainly not becoming a "Westminster democracy," but he avoids statements on how much democracy would be enough for him.

PHOTO GALLERY: THE CHALLENGE OF AFGHANISTAN

At least Steinmeier, at the urging of American Special Envoy Holbrooke, named a special representative for Afghanistan, career diplomat Bernd Mützelburg. But even Mützelburg's nomination was unsuccessful. The Chancellery complained that it had been passed over in the selection process. In the future, the Americans will probably take a careful look at Mützelburg's statements to see if they reflect only Steinmeier's opinion, or those of the chancellor, as well.

But perhaps they will stop asking questions at all. German assistance may be good for the reconstruction of the relatively calm northern provinces. And the Americans will continue to request financial contributions from Berlin, as they did recently when sponsors were being sought to pay the salaries of the Afghan army and Washington wanted the Germans to contribute $100 million (€80 million).

ISAF -- 'I Saw Americans Fighting'

From the American standpoint, this is a small amount. For the Germans, though it is enough to cause a significant dispute among government agencies. Officials bickered over whether the money should be charged to the Defense Ministry's budget or whether it should come out of the government's budget for miscellaneous expenditures.

Meanwhile, the US is already setting parameters. The 17,000 new troops being deployed to Afghanistan will not be under NATO command in Kabul, but will report to a separate "US Forces Command Afghanistan." Many of the new troops have already been tested in house-to-house combat in Iraq.

In Iraq, General Petraeus successfully implemented his ideas on counter-insurgency, turning away from high-tech warfare and toward grueling infantry battles on the street. Instead of staging massive air attacks, Petraeus forged pacts with local insurgents and the civilian population. Things are now going well in Iraq. Petraeus wants to transfer the Iraq model to Afghanistan, and he is unlikely to be deterred by German reservations.

Americans in Kabul already say, with some derision, that the abbreviation for the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, ISAF, actually means: "I saw Americans fighting."

For planning purposes, the Americans have now divided Afghanistan into two regions. The NATO contingent, which includes German, Italian and other troops, will continue to police the north and west. Meanwhile, the US troops will handle the south and east, where the problems are the greatest, on their own.