America's 'Afghan nettle'

By Shamshad Ahmad

History is recording its verdict now. President Barack Hussein Obama has already described the Bush era as a "bleak chapter" in America's history. Every one looks at George W Bush's presidency as eight years of disaster for America and for the world. The neocon agenda precipitated situations allowing America's unabashed use of military power anywhere in the world. A fake casus belli was applied to launch an illegal war on Iraq which caused the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians.

George W Bush himself claimed to be in direct communication with God. He said he was driven with a mission from God. "God tells me, George go and fight those terrorists in Afghanistan. And I did. Then God tells me George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq. And I did." He also had a divine mission to protect and strengthen world's military dictators and authoritarian regimes. In the name of God, Bush played havoc with the world.

With the end of the Bush era, his legacy too is coming to an end. President Obama has already overturned some of the Bush policies. During his election campaign, President Obama had signalled a new direction in US foreign policy bringing change in America's global conduct and behaviour. He pledged to end the war in Iraq. But most significant so far are his initiatives on Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak), which besides a token deployment of additional 17,000 troops in Afghanistan represent a new strategy for what is generally known as America's "other war."

Besides appointing Richard Holbrooke as his special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he ordered an inter-agency policy review through a task force headed by Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer with focus on both military and non-military aspects of the US policy in the AfPak region. This was seen as a significant move to change the course of a conflict that his closest military advisers have been warning the US is not winning.

President Obama himself has also been saying that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. In a recent news conference, he admitted candidly that military means alone will not succeed, and a broader approach involving more effective coordination of military efforts with diplomatic and developmental efforts would be needed for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan.

The most stunning statement President Obama has made so far on this issue was in an interview to The New York Times last week, when he was asked if the United States was winning in Afghanistan. He replied flatly, "No" also indicating that Washington might be opening the door for cooperation with moderate elements among the Taliban. Last month, his Defence Secretary Robert Gates also gave a similar indication by saying that a political agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban might be acceptable if the insurgents laid down their arms. This reflects a big change in the US thinking.

The idea of cooperation with some in the Taliban has been talked about for many months by American military commanders, including the head of US Central Command, Gen David Petraeus. No wonder, Obama cited an argument he attributed to Petraeus that "part of the success in Iraq involved reaching out to people among Sunni Muslim extremists who were willing to work with us." In Obama's view: "There may be some comparable opportunities in Afghanistan and in the Pakistani region, but the situation in Afghanistan is, if anything, more complex."

Last year on his campaign trail, Obama had been suggesting that the possibility of breaking away some elements of the Taliban "should be explored." Now that a comprehensive review of policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan is already in process, he has come out openly signalling adoption of reconciliation as an important initiative for Afghanistan mirroring the strategy used by Gen Petraeus in Iraq. At the same time, he admitted that the "outreach" in Afghanistan may not yield the same success.

This new approach not only speaks volumes of the post-9/11 global onslaught by the US in the name of "self-defence" but also shows inconsistency with recent statements from Washington including the one by Richard Holbrooke criticising Pakistan government for its reconciliation deal with local Taliban leaders in the Swat Valley on enforcement of Islamic law. Islamabad claims its Swat deal is not surrender to the Taliban, but rather an "attempt to drive a wedge between hard-core Taliban leaders and local Islamists."

The Obama Administration now expects to announce new objectives for the "flagging" war in Afghanistan well in time before the NATO Summit in April. According to reports emanating from sources close to Bruce Riedel's task force, the objectives of the new policy are expected to roughly parallel 15 goals contained in a report from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among them were getting rid of terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and adopting a regional approach to reducing the threat of terrorism and extremism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen claims that the policy review addresses not only the problem of safe havens in Pakistan but also the question of making sure that Afghanistan doesn't provide a capability in the long run or an environment in which Al-Qaeda or Taliban could return. The requisite strategy would also focus on the need for "stability, economic development and better governance in Afghanistan," and the development of the Afghan armed forces.

An administration official said that "although the review was not complete, one thrust was that Pakistan needed to recognise that combating extremism was in its own interest as well as that of the US and NATO forces fighting across the border in Afghanistan." On the basis of the final outcome of the policy review which will lay out a three to five year plan, President Obama will explain the "redrawn" US objectives to NATO allies when he attends their summit in Europe next month. His effort will be to keep them on board in the current AfPak engagement.

Washington now also realises that Kabul's fragile government could be protected from collapsing under Taliban pressure only with Pakistan's cooperation and by reinforcing the size and strength of the Afghan armed forces and boosting economic aid in the region. The new US policy in the region is expected to endorse a "doctrine of counter-insurgency" that has military as well as civilian components, and that scales back US expectations for Afghan democracy and self-sufficiency. The main theme of the new Afghan paradigm will be that the military alone cannot win the war.

All these plans and contingencies, howsoever well-meaning, seem to be coming too late. Had the US not walked away from Afghanistan after the Soviet pull out, perhaps the history of our world today would have been different. If the world had remained engaged with the people of Afghanistan, providing them strength and succour to rebuild their country devastated in the Afghan-Soviet war, the situation today might have been totally different.

Once the world decided to turn its back on Afghanistan, the Taliban were left with no incentive to cooperate with the world. While the international community continued to demonise the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and his associates took advantage of the Afghan "tradition of hospitality and friendship" and abused their trust to spread terror across the globe. The continued turmoil in Afghanistan provided an ideal breeding ground for global terrorism and extremism. And Afghans are not the only victims of the Afghan tragedy.

Pakistan has suffered immeasurably in the aftermath of the post-Soviet occupation era. It is now a pivotal "frontline" state in the War On Terror as key US ally and partner. But its role and capability in this process will be predicated on the overall political, socio-economic and security environment of South Asia and on how the US engages itself in helping the region to overcome its problems.

Regrettably Washington's support for protracted dictatorship in Pakistan only fuelled despair and despondency among its people giving rise to extremist influences in the country. We are now passing through another grave crisis as a result of governmental crackdown on democratic forces struggling for independence of judiciary, and imposition of unconstitutional Governor Rule in the largest province of the country.

Washington must understand that by standing for genuine democracy and the rule of law in this country, it would be weakening extremism. By now it must have heard the clarion call that a stronger and more independent judiciary in Pakistan means a weaker Taliban. One hopes the US doesn't take, as it did in the case of its Afghan nettle, another ten years to realise the right approach. Alas! Washington has too many unlearnt lessons.