INDIA'S EMBATTLED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: POLICY OPTIONS

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

India's embattled security environment today has crystallized as a result of Indian foreign policy failures to take charge of India's neighborhood as a regional power and further still India's failures to use her political and economic leverages to ensure that the external intrusive powers in South Asia respect her strategic sensitivities. These policy failures have been more noticeable in the last five years.

India's political and policy establishments in different political dispensations have yet to recognize that diplomacy not backed by muscular power and muscular power not backed by adroit diplomacy end in failure and embattled security environment. South Asia in the case of India highlights this dictum. India has lacked the will to use power to ensure a stable South Asia security environment.

India to be admitted in the global strategic calculus would need first to conclusively demonstrate that it does not shy away or is meek and feeble in ordering her own regional strategic environment as the predominant power in South Asia.

India has yet to demonstrate that conclusively to the global strategic community. The recent crises in South Asia have found India wanting in this direction. Significantly noticeable was that in the wake of Mumbai 9/11, it was regrettable to observe the Indian Government counting on the United States to politically coerce Pakistan on India's behalf.

With General Elections due in April 2009, the present Indian Government is incapable of exploring fresh policy options to reorder its embattled security environment which has arisen from its own acts of foreign policy omissions and commissions. A new political dispensation, if it comes into power should ponder over fresh policy options to reinforce India's regional power weight and standing. If the same political dispensation returns to power, it would have a lot to answer on its foreign policy failures and would be well advised too to ponder afresh in light of the flaws that have constantly stood pointed out in this Author's Papers in the last five years.

This Paper therefore reviews India's policies in South Asia and options to bring to order its embattled security environment, not by advantage of hindsight, but as a reinforcement of what has been asserted by this Author in his earlier Papers.

In that light this Paper offers the following perspectives and policy options that India should adopt to ensure that India's strategic sensitivities as a regional power are respected both by the external intrusive powers in South Asia and by South Asian countries themselves:

• India's Regional Power Status Impeded by United States and China: Use India's Comprehensive Strategic Leverages


• Pakistan: India's Policy should Rest on National Security Imperatives and Not Dancing with the Wolves


• Afghanistan: India's Priorities to Assist Nation Building Not Military Involvement


• Bangladesh's Political Stability: India's Strategic Imperative


• Nepal: India Must Contain Enlarging Chinese Penetration under Maoist Government


• Sri Lanka: India's National Security Interests Should Predominate Over Domestic Political Compulsions


• Bhutan: Imperatives for India's Assistance in Capacity Building of Defensive Capabilities


• India's War Preparedness: A Pressing Strategic Imperative


• India's Options to Re-Order Her Embattled Strategic Environment

India's Regional Power Status Impeded by United States and China: Use India's Comprehensive Strategic Leverages

India's regional power status in South Asia is not under dispute in terms of strategic, political and economic power. However, India's regional power status in military terms is brought into dispute by Pakistan. Pakistan for nearly half a century has been built-up militarily by massive infusion of military aid and weaponry by the United States and China.

The United States and China, therefore, have encouraged Pakistan to militarily box far above its true weight in terms of its confrontational policies against India. By itself Pakistan is incapable of strategic defiance.

Pakistan, therefore is the root cause of India's embattled security environment in South Asia Strategic cynicism would prompt one to believe that both the United States and China have a vested strategic interest in impeding India's regional power status.

India can understand China's sinister strategic designs against India and thereby its use of Pakistan as a proxy strategic de-stabilizer of India.

Sinister strategic designs against India cannot be attributed to the United States. It does need to be emphasized, however, that India cannot be expected to accept endlessly that Pakistan's strategic utility in the US global strategic blueprint has to have a primacy in South Asia and outweigh India's regional power status and that India should acquiesce accordingly.

India itself is to be blamed for not getting this message through effectively to the United States that it needs to correct the distortions in its South Asia policies and to China that India today is capable of generating strategic counter-pressure points against it in response to its convoluted South Asia policies centred on Pakistan.

Asserted by this Author many times in his writings is the reality that the United States future continued strategic embedment in Asia would rest heavily on India and not on China and Pakistan. A pre-requisite of this would be India's emergence as a strong and strategically independent regional power, which has all the prospects of being a USA-friendly power.

The India policy establishment must press home this strategic advantage to the United States along with the tremendous economic prospects that India offers to the United States.

When it comes to China and its strategically disruptive policies against India in South Asia, diplomacy and persuasion offer not much scope to India. India's assertion of its regional power status to China needs to be manifested in terms of concrete counter-strategic pressure points, namely (1) India upgrading its defense infrastructure and military capacity along the India-Tibet border (2) India's strategic weapons and space programs to be put on fast track (3) Increase in India's maritime presence in the Western Pacific (4) More significantly, open and active encouragement to the liberation movements in Xinjiang and Tibet should be used as pressure points.

Since the United States and China have a strategic overlap when it comes to Pakistan, and that precludes their not changing their existing policies in South Asia, India must then go in for a reinforcement and force-multiplication of its traditional strategic partnership with Russia.

India's comprehensive strategic leverages against United States and China can be expected to grow with time (unless India's political leadership stumbles) and the Indian establishment should move forward to capitalize them.

Pakistan: India's Policy Should Rest on National Security Imperatives and Not Dancing with the Wolves

India's flawed prognostications on Pakistan during the last five years or so, and the foreign policies that flowed from these faulty assessments were brought to a dead-end in November 2008. Nothing exemplified move eloquently the failure of Indian foreign policies on Pakistan than the events of Mumbai 9/11 and thereafter.

This Author's SAAG Paper No. 3015 dated 16.01.2009 entitled "India's Foreign Policies on Pakistan Reach Dead-End" refers.

India's foreign policies on Pakistan stood abdicated in favour of Washington in the hope that India's accommodative stances on Pakistan would somehow hasten the materialization of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. From 2004 onwards the Nuclear Deal became the single most obsessive fixation of the present Government and led to India's appeasement policies towards Pakistan.

The hallmarks of India's foreign policy on Pakistan in the period 2004-2009 have been (1) India seen as an accomplice in the perpetuation of military regime in Pakistan (2) India's stand-aloof posture on restoration of democracy in Pakistan, which is a strategic imperative for India reinforced this perception (3) India's limitless tolerance of Pakistani's Islamic Jihadi terrorist bombings all over India (4) India's military paralysis in not inflicting sharp ripostes on Pakistan Army for their "war of terrorism"against India The list can go on endlessly of Pakistan's trespasses against India.

India's national security imperatives would have demanded (1) Pakistan Army (as opposed to the Pakistani people) be targeted militarily to make them desist from war of terrorism against, India (2) Proxy war against "Pakistan Army"should have been intensified (3) Peace dialogue and peace process with Pakistan Army's military regime should have broken off.

While the Pakistan Army all along intensified their war of terrorism against India in the period 2004-2009 and were merrily "double-timing"the United States, India merrily went along in perpetuating Pakistan Army rule in Pakistan by taking a cowardly plea that it has to do business with whoever is in power in Pakistan.

Has the United States done business with whoever is in power in Iran for the last thirty years?

India's foreign policy in Pakistan therefore amounted to an abject surrender to the Pakistan Army regime which was the patron-in-chief of the war of terrorism against India, creator of Islamic Jihadi terrorist organizations like the LeT wedded to Islamization of India and a likely source of nuclear terrorism against India.

In relation to Pakistan, Indian diplomacy has so far failed in cultivating domestic leverages in Pakistan which could over-throw the grip of the Pakistan Army on its governance. On the contrary, India's political establishment "lionized"General Musharraf and India's security establishment gave unwarranted "certificates of honor"to General Kiyani, the present Chief.

The Pakistan policy of the present India Government in the last five years can best be summed up as "dancing with the wolves"of the Pakistan Army rather than concentrating on facilitating the emergence of India-friendly civilian democratic regimes in Pakistan. The above discussion on the fatal flaws of India's policy on Pakistan would itself provide the clues to the options that India must adopt in a totally new blueprint for India's Pakistan policy resting solely on India's national security imperatives, and that only,and not on perpetuating Pakistan Army's grip on Pakistan's governance.

India's new Pakistan policies must factor-out the Pakistan Army as the "Center of Gravity" of Pakistan and focus on reaching out to the Pakistani people and their yearnings for pure democracy. It is regrettable that in Indian TV debates, retired diplomats and military generals asset that military rulers in Pakistan are more preferable. Whose line are these gentlemen advocating?

Nor should India's policy on Pakistan be allowed to be distorted by the bogey of Pakistan's impending Talibanization which could end in India being drawn into a strategic quagmire in Af-Pak. This Author's SAAG Paper No. 3079 dated 02 March 2009 entitled "Pakistan's Talibanization is No Strategic Threat to India" refers.

Such an eventuality would provide a window of strategic opportunity for India as discussed in this Paper.

Afghanistan: India's Priorities to Assist Nation Building Not Military Involvement

The United States, if it ever was genuine and sincere about India's military involvement in Afghanistan should have given that invitation to India in 2002 itself. That it did not do so then indicated that the United States envisaged no Indian military role in Afghanistan in deference to Pakistan Army's sensitivities.

What has followed thereafter need not be recounted. The Pakistan Army has not only endangered US & NATO Forces on Afghanistan but also endangered Pakistan's existence by fostering the creeping Talibanization by its strategic delinquencies.

Since India is neither the creator of the Taliban or its destabilization of Afghanistan, India should desist from any military role in Afghanistan.

India should confine itself to nation-building and reconstruction programs in Afghanistan as is being done currently. India should not endanger its future prospects in Afghanistan by a military involvement in the current situation.

Bangladesh's Political Stability: India's Strategic Imperative

Bangladesh's recent General Elections which witnessed the return to political power of Begum Sheikh Hasina with an unprecedented mandate augured well both for Bangladesh and for India too. A lot of credit is due to the Bangladesh Army Chief too who in the last two years prepared the groundwork for fair and free elections.

That Begum Sheikh Hasina is known as India-friendly in Bangladesh political circles and was voted as such into power with an unprecedented mandate should indicate that Bangladesh people second her India-friendly policies.

The fact that the development was not well received by anti-Indian sections of Bangladesh and their external patrons manifested itself last month in a violent para-military forces (BDR) mutiny with horrific killings which were intended to provoke a civil war in Bangladesh and the overthrow of Begun Sheikh Hasina.

In such an environment so created by anti-Indian forces and that they would persist so in the future, it is strategically important for India to assist Bangladesh politically and economically towards achieving stability and so also in the military neutralization of threats to Bangladesh's security.

Strong imperatives exist for India to work intensely for forging an effective strategic partnership with Bangladesh. This Author's SAAG Paper No. 2765 dated 11.07.2008 entitled "Bangladesh-India Strategic Partnership: The Imperatives" highlights the imperatives and the options that should be pursued.

Nepal: India Must Contain Enlarging Chinese Penetration under Maoist Government

Nepal was virtually handed over to the Maoists by faulty foreign policies of the present Government. India's national security interests dictated that irrespective of the ruling party or the diplomatic establishments personal inclinations, the monarchy in Nepal and the Royal Nepal Army should have been buttressed by the Indian Government to withstand the Maoist onslaught.

The Nepalese Maoists who could not capture political power on the strength of their guns were virtually handed over political power by a flawed Indian foreign policy.

In one stroke, faulty Indian policies led to the disappearance of the most sizeable "buffer state"separating India from Chinese occupied Tibet for over 2000 km. This has led to China now virtually sitting on Indian borders in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

A Maoist China-friendly government in Kathmandu facilitates a deep Chinese penetration of Nepal's security apparatus, intelligence set-up and other agencies all detrimental to India's national security.

Scope still exists to limit and roll-back the Maoists success in Nepal's polity and India would not be found wanting in friends in Nepal ready to assist India in such a process. India's policy establishment needs to exploit this for her own national security gains. Multiple options are available to India.

Sri Lanka: India's National Security Interests Should Predominate Over Domestic Political Compulsions

India's national security interests demand that there exists a stable and secure Sri Lanka, friendly to India and immune to Chinese and Pakistani overtures.

So far India's domestic political compulsions of Tamilnadu politics have limited India's unequivocal support to Sri Lanka in combating the LTTE menace. While political aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils need to be addressed but that does not mean ethnic division of Sri Lanka or allowing the LTTE to tear asunder Sri Lanka by insurgency and terrorism.

India's best policy options in Sri Lanka should center around these strategic realities.

India as it is has hardly any friends on South Asia and Sri Lanka is one of them. This bond must be nurtured unapologetically and without reservations.

Bhutan: Imperatives for India's Assistance in Capacity Building of Defensive Capabilities

Bhutan has a critical geo-strategic significance in India's strategic calculus. China weighs down heavily on Bhutan's northern borders along Chinese occupied Tibet. The Chumbi Valley and the Jaldhaka Gorge in continuation is like a dagger pointing at India's Siliguri Corridor.

With Nepal on its side, China can be tempted to create political turbulence for Bhutan through those Bhutan Nepalese presently residing in Nepal besides Chinese military intrusions in Bhutan.

Bhutan would therefore require sizeable infusions of Indian financial and military aid to enhance Bhutan's capacity-building in terms of defensive capabilities to deal with China's external and internal security threats to Bhutan.

India's War Preparedness: A Pressing Strategic Imperative

This shall be the subject of an entirely separate Paper by this Author on the subject.

The Indian Armed Forces are always ready to go into battle with whatever they have at their disposal. But that does not imply that they should go into battle or project India's power with one-hand tied due to lack of adequate war-preparedness resulting from political and bureaucratic callousness.

This seems to have been a major factor in restraining the present Indian Government from going in for a military strike option following Mumbai 9/11.

India's emergence as a strong and assertive regional power is critically dependent on an unusually high state of war preparedness of its Armed Forces.

Then only India's diplomacy can become that much more effective when the military power-projection of the Indian Armed Forces is visible as a credible instrument.

India's Options to Re-Order Her Embattled Strategic Environment

No soft options exist for any regional power to re-order its embattled strategic environment. Rather than be distracted by a single country fixation (in this case Pakistan), India has to adopt an integrated perspective of the entire South Asian strategic landscape and craft its policies accordingly.

In terms of policy options and Indian diplomacy, an integrated perspective of the embattled South Asia security environment, reveals the following pattern to this Author in terms of "Irretrievable States", "Partially Retrievable States"and "Retrievable States"in terms of their amenability and inclinations for friendly postures to India and assisting India in the furtherance of a stable and peaceful environment in South Asia:

• Irretrievable States : Pakistan


• Partially Retrievable State : Nepal


• Retrievable States (India Friendly) : Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Bangladesh

The categorization is self-explanatory and pointers to this effect discussed earlier in this Paper, Pakistan however needs further elaboration.

Pakistan has been classified as an "Irretrievable State"for India to restore stability in South Asia for the following reasons all of which suggest that no amount of Indian appeasement policies and accommodative stances can turn around Pakistan to be India-friendly:

• Pakistan Army induced Talibanization of Pakistan and political polarization in Pakistan, would ensure return of Pakistan Army regimes to the detriment of Indian security.


• The Pakistan Army seems to be in retreat against the Taliban and Islamic Jihadi organizations, endangering the very existence of the Pakistani state. Such a trend would prompt Pakistan Army to indulge in military adventurism against India to divert domestic attention.


• Pakistan Army and its military hierarchy are implacable foes of India and with no hopeful signs that such mindset would change in the foreseeable future.


• China as India's Enemy Number One would continue to be Pakistan's strategic patron, even if USA in the foreseeable future detaches itself strategically from Pakistan. China would ensure that the Pakistan Army persists in confrontational attitudes with India.

Contextually, India therefore is left with the following options:

• Contain and isolate Pakistan until such time it is Pakistan Army ruled or Pakistan Army controlled. No peace dialogue with military rulers should be undertaken.


• India should be pro-active in "crusading" for democracy in Pakistan. This Author's SAAG Paper No. 2132 dated 12.02.2007 - entitled "Pakistan's Restoration of Democracy Should Be an Indian Strategic Imperative" refers. Pakistan's so called democracy today is firmly in the grip of the Pakistan Army and the Zardari regime is a mere continuation of General Musharraf's military regime.


• India should assist South Asian countries less Pakistan to move towards stability and South Asia regional integration with provision of Indian political, economy and even military support systems.


• The future of Pakistan be left to be resolved by USA, China and Saudi Arabia.


• India's war preparedness to be kept at an all-time high to meet Pakistan or China generated contingencies within India and in the neighborhood. More immediately India needs to be militarily prepared to meet the challenges of spillover turbulence generated by Talibanization of Pakistan or even its possible disintegration.

Concluding Observations

India's embattled security environment is likely to persist until such time India's political establishment gathers courage to strategically discipline Pakistan once again as it did in 1971 resulting in the break up of a part of Pakistan and the domestic devaluation of the Pakistan Army.

India's forceful actions in 1971 against the Pakistan Army military regime ensured peace in South Asia till 1999 (for quarter of a century). That time too India, had to pick up the gauntlet of American and Chinese opposition to India's military options.

India then had no comparable comprehensive strategic leverages as it has today. To reorder India's embattled security environment and ensure that Pakistan respects India's regional power status by not boxing above its strategic weight a repeat of 1971 may be the only viable strategic option left to India.

Hopefully, this option may not materialize if the Pakistani people overthrow Pakistan Army's grip on the nation's governance and bring the Pakistan Army under firm civilian democratic government.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)