War rhetoric in terror ridden Nuclear South Asia

Nargis Zahra

Terror and terrorism have not only become buzzwords but also have gradually replaced the words and now concepts of war and battlefield. In this regard one can take example of Asia and specifically India and Pakistan. The unique feature of this war in South Asia is traditional security paradigm followed by both nuclear neighbours. This is evident not only from Lahore attacks on Sri Lankan players and subsequent blame game between India and Pakistan but Mumbai attacks were also followed by the same rhetoric. For instance the External Affairs Minister of India, Yashwant Sinha, in an interview to BBC London dismissed suggestions that it was under US pressure to resume talks with Pakistan. He said: "Was it a sign of soft State that we deployed our Army on the border and achieved what we wanted,'' he further said "nothing can be achieved by talks in the present circumstances" and "it is not important what the US says, or the EU says. It is our battle and we would win it. Support from different parts of the world is a welcome step, but the fight is ours.''

On the other hand when US Senator McCain talked to Pakistani authorities they were cautious in their response. Pakistani Premier Gillani on the one hand gave vent to desire of cordial relations while on the other he assured that Pakistan can make India pay in the same coin if put into a war situation. South Asian neighbours are every now and then going through a phase of diplomatic tension. Aggressive statements are exchanged, media on both sides plays nationalist role and war hysteria is ever present in the form of war phobia. Albeit Lahore and Mumbai attacks were well planned and organised but not the first or unique example in strategic history of nuclear South Asia. These kind of attacks and diplomatic tensions sometimes lead to border ambushes and wars. Not to one's surprise such tensions have become routine for the public on both sides of the border. This factor is especially prevalent in the wake of region's role in international war against terror combined with the now and then surfacing tensions between India and Pakistan. Following antagonistic history and nuclearisation of twin states in 1998, there has been a profound and persistent belief in the minds of Western policy makers and thinkers that the region may be at risk of a nuclear war. This view is reemphasized by the spokesmen of India and Pakistan who get support of nuclear deterrence and threat of war prior to considering any other option as a bargaining tactic. While nuclearisation could have brought drastic changes to South Asian security thinking, the twin elements of Indo-US nuclear deal and Pak-US joint anti terrorist ventures have added new dimensions to the traditional security thinking in the region.

Despite the world over paradigm shift from traditional to non-traditional security, for South Asia the traditional sphere remains paramount. This notion is based upon the factor of unequal military force structures existing between India and Pakistan compounded with the historical legacy of tensions and a long contiguous border. Although there are strong arguments to affirm or negate the probability of a nuclear war as an ultimate policy option for security, the point to be pondered about is that now the capacity of an absolute destructive weapon does exist on both sides of the border. Moreover they use nuclear deterrence most frequently to resolve their mutual disputes at any level. The nuclear neighbours of South Asia are classic example of most distrustful coexisting states with refreshing willingness to tempt war. Overt or covert, clear or unclear but both states do have a nuclear policy and doctrine. These doctrines are of utmost importance to understand the relevance and characteristics of current traditional security paradigm in South Asia. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan has transformed the Asian region into a unique part of the world having four nuclear states namely China, North Korea, India and Pakistan. The impacts of the emergence of such regional structure are bound to be multi-dimensional and long-term in this most populated area of the world. South Asia is a region showing contradictory parallel signs of development and poverty among its population. The security structure of the region (South Asia) is predominantly bipolar, where two out of seven states are nuclearised having history of inter- and intra-state conflicts, fundamentalist and westernized elite, absolute poverty of more than 40% and two antagonistic, neighbours with nukes.

Though one may not term the region as war prone but it has history of prolonged inter-state conflicts and wars? National security is still the only definition of "security" in this region. Although socio-economic and humanitarian factors have paved a way into the discussions of theoreticians, the practitioners and policy makers are persistently humming the tones of state security to ensure peace in the region. This is evident from the following statement of former president Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan Times (July 2007): "Despite a paradigm shift in security world over, for South Asia the traditional sphere of security would remain paramount till the resolution of all disputes, mainly Kashmir." Whether it is life of Bombay civilians or of Sri Lankans in Pakistan, it is taken in terms of state security .It is to be noted that such attacks are harsh ground realities faced by the citizens, giving a touch of uncertainty to their daily life routines. These have to be tackled in ways other than passing the blames and exchanging aggressive statements.

The leaders on both sides of the border would have to realise that individual is inevitable building block of a nation and individual security should be foremost priority to be assured. Instead having overlapped security pacts and arms deals is not going to help counter threats to civilian security. Albeit the fact India has always been expediently seeking for defence pacts across the globe specifically to counter China and not forgetting to mention Pakistan. India has reached a most comprehensive and far reaching military agreement with USA, named the 123 Agreement. Under the agreement, US will enlist India as the chief agency that helps it "embed" itself strategically in Asia to ensure Washington's dominance in this increasingly important region in the face of a rising challenge from China. In return, India is likely to be given the firm offer of some 1970s-generation weapons platforms like F-16 warplanes, and a new version of the Patriot anti-missile system, as well as co-production of US-developed weapon. It conforms to the stated US goals of containing China; stabilising Afghanistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, countering and curbing terrorism in the tribal belt of Pakistan and dissuading Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

India's global aspirations are compelling it to get involved in military exercises with different countries. This strategic picture does not present a wishful optimistic outcome or at least strategic culture in future of South Asia. Whosoever is behind Mumbai attacks? The riddle is not to be resolved the way it is being? Such nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani political elite and war hysteria from Indian side may escalate into war. It is alarming for the security equation of South Asia in traditional terms that India not having formal obligations of alliance agreements at large, at one hand, is incurring development of forces on the other. It had first joint Naval exercise named Malabar with US in 1992.Since then it has held joint exercises with Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom and some countries of West Asia. Not to mention the notion of insecurity is deeply inculcated in the psychology of Pakistani strategists, which may lead to another episode of arms race. Once proudly non-aligned India is now involved in a global-cum-regional arms race and development. It is evident from the fact that Indian DRDO and nine defence production undertakings of public sector are running profitably. India is keeping all the doors for military cooperation open in turn making Pakistan insecure who is seeking its security through utilising the current major non NATO ally status (MNNAS) enduring drone attacks on its mainland and looking forward to the Obama's policy towards South Asia. As India is strategic ally of US and Pakistan that of China, the fact could have served Pakistan's security dilemma in the region.

But the realities of traditional security paradigm in South Asia are more complicated than seem to a man in the street. China has gone through another round of joint military exercises on Indian land at the end of last year, the previous exercises took place on Chinese land. India also had exercises with three other states including USA, Japan and Singapore in 2007 in the Bay of Bengal which raised concerns among Chinese leadership. Indian broader aspirations and Pakistani regional security concerns lead to contradicting security objectives of both states. This is the fault line of mutual cooperation where long-term, persistent reconciliation seems difficult to be approached. Once again, however, the emergence of transnational threats from Islamist extremists, and continuing internal ethnic, sectarian, and tribal tensions dominate the security problems in this region. Conventionally India is maintaining third largest forces (Army, Navy, Air Force put together) in the world. In segregation, it possesses third largest army, fourth largest navy and fifth largest air force. India is spending 8.5 bn $ per annum under head of defence budget. On the other, Pakistan, in an effort to follow the suite is spending more than Rs 4 bn $ a year on its forces development and maintenance. As far as manpower is concerned Pakistan armed forces are 6,000, 000, while Indians are one million.

It is to be noted that Pakistan is spending more on its defence in terms of per capita income. One may conclude that though nuclear security is a form of traditional security but it has not served the purpose of irrelevance of conventional forces in South Asia. Both states collectively share 80% of the regional military spending. Considering the case of India and Pakistan one can easily relate the 1948, 1965, 1971, 1999 wars, and the crisis of 2002 then 2003 and now 2008-09, with the concept of war or threat of war as an instrument of policy. Keeping in mind the love for military expenditures on both sides of the border one can recall the recurrent hostility in history. In 1948 both India and Pakistan tried to capture princely state Kashmir. In 1965 war broke out in escalation from Rann of Kutch episode, following the revelation of a Russian scientist that the area is rich in oil resources. In the spring of 1965, both the states stepped up patrolling activity in that area and soon serious clashes occurred, where Pakistani forces quickly out-manoeuvred Indian troops, winning an easy victory.

The Rann of Kutch encounter left Pakistani forces dangerously over-confident and the Indians frustrated. Pakistan's over-confidence that it would be able to capture the remaining part of Kashmir brought the two nations to war. Similarly in 1971 India exploited the opportunity of internal dissention in East Pakistan, intervened militarily which led to a war and then the dismemberment of Pakistan. Following that, the occupation of Siachen by India in 1984, Brass-tacks event of 1987, and Kargil strategic miscalculation of 1999, strained diplomatic relations in 2001 and 2002, and last but literally not least the recent Mumbai attacks and following war threats, all are examples of either use or probability of use of military instrument to achieve political objectives. With the nuclearization of South Asia it is observed that both India and Pakistan have started to become more self-reliant. Though many analysts may take it as confidence but talking in war terms every now and then may lead to serious consequences anytime. It was such kind of confidence in self-reliance on part of William Kaiser of Germany and Nicholas of Russia which led to the 1st World War. Not only this, similar thinking patterns led to a miscalculated war against terror which in turn became a major cause for current economic crunch in international market. In case of South Asia Pakistan has an Indian centric security strategy and following the Indian suit it has also entered into a strategic partnership but with China and has already gone through a round of the military exercises with Saudi navy on Pakistani coastal area.

Though tacitly but an arms and development race is under way in South Asia on conventional front. One can conclude that whether the animosity is historical or religious, traditional paradigm of security calculation is never irrelevant for both South Asian states. With the induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, war that was a win-lose game became the lose-lose game. That is why both the nuclear states of South Asia refrained from all-out war. If we analyze the history of Indo-Pak relationship, we find a number of low-intensity conflicts along with major wars. The most crucial example is that of Kargil, which took place soon after the nuclearisation and here we see that both the states tried their best to refrain from using the nuclear weapons and let the conflict escalate into a full-scale war. They knew that if the situation gets out of control it would not only be threatening to them but also to the entire region. Keeping the historical practices in view, it could be said that in future there will only be low-intensity conflicts between India and Pakistan, mainly because of contentious issues like of Kashmir, terrorism and extremism as both the states have urged for more CBMs before proceeding ahead to resolve Kashmir issue.

But the fact of coming to negotiating table is an obvious outcome of the nuclear status enjoyed by both state. Conclusion of a nuclear arms deal between India and USA has left many question marks for other powers in the Asian region specifically Pakistan. In addition to it the presence of United States in the region on permanent basis, Indian economic and defence relations with US, Pak-China strategic partnership, extremist elements and probable evaporation of state writ in Pakistan, all present a complex alarming picture to predict future. It might be concluded that the nature of war has changed. Now rationale for fighting a war is more ideology based in form of frustrated cultural deprivations. For a long time the world remained indifferent towards the fate of South Asia. Major Powers, particularly the United States, neglected it. Now the nuclear bangs of the two countries have suddenly alerted everybody that South Asia exists and it has enormous problems and potential for initiating a nuclear conflict at the regional and global levels, which the world so desperately wants to avoid. Thus, South Asian states face multi-dimensional challenges to security. They face the threat of war in the absence of mechanism that prevent conflicts and promote peaceful solutions to outstanding problems. They run the risk of being drawn into a ruinous arms race as in case of India and Pakistan, or into an ever-increasing defence burden because of internal strife.

They are to face, contain and curb the extremist elements in their politics and societies. Both South Asian nuclear antagonists need to re-think their security paradigms in more comprehensive and cooperative terms. It should not only include probable threat of war against each other but also existing war against extremism. Its future paradigm must not rest on security against but security with the all neighbouring South Asian states. The nature of threats to security is so complex and varied that the mere size and resources of the larger states provide little protection against them; in fact, lager the state, more numerous are the vulnerabilities of over-stretched and over-taxed administrative systems. A radical new view of cooperative security can have a decisive multiplier effect on the capacities of South Asian states to counteract the manifold threats that they face on the eve of a new millennium. The political pundits of India and Pakistan should feel more responsible towards their military buildups. They should not exchange threats at every blast by the terrorists. They need to give rise to more mature a strategic culture which leaves least chances for any war or crossfire. It will serve the people better than the nukes they stockpile or are pride of. People are ultimate unit to be secured, the very logic for existence of state. Terrorism is an outcome of ignorance of non-traditional security concerns and can be successfully addressed by the same. It should be over with traditional security in South Asia as war is major tool for traditional security and nukes with both states have left no room for any other war.