Hamid Hussain
ASI Assistant Sub Inspector DSP Deputy Superintendent of Police FC Frontier Corps GHQ General Head Quarters IED Improvised Explosive Device IDP Internally Displaced Person LEAs Law Enforcement Agencies MG Major General NLI Northern Light Infantry N.W.F.P. North West Frontier Province SSG Special Services Group SHO Station House Officer Subedar Major A Sergeant Major equivalent rank of Pakistan army |
Table of Abbreviations
'We must be clear sighted in the beginning, for, as in their budding we discern not the danger, soon in their full growth we perceive not the remedy.' Montaigne
Changed Battlefield
'Religion becomes a dangerous arm when one knows how to make use of it.' Frederick the Great
- Militants had two years to prepare their battleground. Initial base was in the mountains with training, logistics and command facilities. The region was acting as base area of foot soldiers and a spring board for forays into neighboring districts. In 2007, army pushed militants back deep into mountains but in view of lack of general public support it had to call off the operation. Militants came back to hamlets, villages and main towns and pretty soon government authority evaporated like thin mist disappears on sunrise. General public and law enforcement agencies including police and constabulary were sidelined very quickly by most brutal atrocities. This included beheadings (many of them videotaped and put on internet), public executions (also available on internet) and destruction and forced occupation of houses. Government buildings including schools were destroyed. In the aftermath of the so called peace deal or Nizam-e-Adal regulation, Swat ceased to exist as part of the state of Pakistan. Those who could leave left the area while others who could not leave simply tried to live with new rulers (i.e. inviting local militant commanders for dinners). What else they could do? They were like an abused wife abandoned by everyone to live with a new abusive husband who had forced himself to get satisfaction.
- Pakistani public then got the rude awakening when triumphant militants started to show their cards. The crowning moment was when Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-Muhammadi (TSNM) declared all not adhering to his version as apostates. His long list of apostates also included justices of higher courts and clerics. It was not a pretty sight and many Pakistanis now started to demand action by government to recover the lost ground. The day of reckoning came sooner than expected. Military's calculation changed with increased public support. As one Colonel operating in the Swat area put it, 'fighting insurgency in one's own country is hell; but it feels a lot better when the nation is behind you'.
What was done Right?
'War is an art and as such is not susceptible of explanation by fixed formula'. General George Patton
- Use of decent number of troops. Troops from 7th Division (Peshawar based commanded by MG Naveed Zaman), 19th Division (Mangla based division commanded by MG Sajjad Ghani), 37th Division (Gujranwala based division commanded by MG Ijaz Hussain Awan) and SSG troops (commanded by MG Haroon Aslam. Previous commander of SSG late MG Amir Faisal Alvi used to lead his troops even in the field and accompanied in many missions) and FC troops (commanded by MG Tariq Khan) are operating in the area.
- Use of decent mix of troops; i.e. regular troops, SSG, FC. Sniper teams have been deployed at crucial ridges, however details of their success can not be analyzed due to the secrecy.
- SSG operated aggressively in securing crucial heights and securing Peochar valley and in the process paid a heavy price with a number of officers and soldiers killed and wounded.
- Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions have been introduced in the area. Majority of soldiers of NLI are from northern areas and familiar with the mountainous terrain. More importantly, they see extremists who are staunchly sectarian as existential threat and their heart and soul is in the fight.
- This time someone paid attention to geography and there was good homework. Possible escape routes were adequately plugged. In north Swat borders northern area and Chitral where population is deeply hostile to Taliban. In 1980s the fathers of neo-Taliban marauded the area and memories of that time are fresh among the population. In view of this reality and difficult terrain not much troops were deployed in that area. On the north-eastern border is the district of Kohistan and on southeast Shangla. Troops were inserted from these areas as well as in blocking positions. Some militants escaping from Swat landed in Shangla but army quickly tackled them preventing them from entrenching there. Now militants are moving out of Shangla to more remote areas such as Kala Dhaka. In northern Swat, a division strength force is operating against extremists. On the western border of Swat lie Upper and Lower Dir districts. Troops deployed in Dir engaged local militants to prevent reinforcements reaching to Swat and so far they have been successful to keep militants busy. Local armed villagers in Dir are also harassing militants preventing them to entrench in isolated areas. In south lies the Buner district and a small tip in southwestern area borders Malakand region. Links of Swati militants are strongest with militants in Dir and Malakand and this region will see more prolonged fighting. Quarantine of Swat is not perfect but so far military has been successful in forcing extremists to take stand.
- Simultaneous attacks from periphery inwards by regular troops and dropping SSG deeper in strongholds in mountains disrupted command structure of militants forcing commanders to flee.
- Militant's stronghold in Peochar valley of Swat is being cleared now.
- Artillery and air assets were limited to militants known bases in mountains and not used liberally in major towns. This increased the risk to troops and they sacrificed more but it was the price worth paying to avoid large scale damage.
- In some cases where houses were occupied by militants, locals gave approval for targeting them to slay the demons.
- Aggressive posture was adopted in other tribal areas. In Bajawar, military has been trying to clean that area and militant's stronghold in Charmang is being squeezed from different sides. In Waziristan, where militants tried to assemble in Jani Khel area for assault on nearby town of Bannu to distract military were tackled forcefully and given a sound beating. Similarly, militant strongholds in Darra Adam Khel and Orakzai agency were pounded to keep them off balance.
- In addition to military aspect, a special support group headed by Mangla Corps Commander Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmad was given the task of helping IDPs and provide assistance to civilians stuck in the cross fire in violent areas. This group has tried its best but the task is enormous in view of large number of IDPs.
Way Forward
'When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing.' Sun Tzu
- In addition to ongoing operations, military and intelligence officials on ground need to keep channels open with remote local communities. They should be encouraged and supported to keep harassing the militants. In early stages when strength of militants is small and their hold precarious is the best time for local communities to strike. If you wait too long, then you loose local support because they are coerced by extremists by that time. Government should keep it's momentum to keep militants on the run.
- This time operations should be taken to their logical conclusions both in Swat and rest of the troubled territories. In case of Swat, after pushing militants out the twin task of restoring civilian authority and constant vigilance to prevent comeback of militants will need practical but long term planning.
- There are two possible approaches for next rounds of the battle in other areas.. The demon is multi-headed hydra with some fangs more poisonous than others. One approach is to go after the big kill in Waziristan first to finish off Baitullah Mahsud's gang. Second approach is to first go after small fish in other tribal agencies such as Khyber, Orakzai, Mohmand to squeeze the air out of the rat holes and retreating militants coming to Waziristan are then dealt a final blow. In the meantime, aggressive posture should be maintained to reduce Baitullah's fiefdom. Final slaying of the demon should then be carefully planned.
- Operation in Waziristan will need coordination with Afghanistan and U.S. Details can be worked out depending on the local conditions.
- Mohmand agency may be a model for next round of operations in other agencies. Bajawar and Mohmand agencies were testing grounds for new FC. In Mohmand agency, in the last one year, extremists have been pushed out of crucial areas and room is provided for traditional leadership to reassert some control. More importantly, in Mohmand, FC is running the show and regular troops are used only on as needed basis. FC is the right instrument and good training and equipment as well as successes will increase the morale of the force.
- Shia Turis of Kurram agency have faced the brunt of extremist wrath. It is time to win Turis back and help arrange a long term truce with their Sunni tribal rivals to isolate extremists.
- One lesson from the whole painful saga of the last few years is plain and simple. At the earliest sign of Rabies, put the infected puppies to sleep otherwise you risk quick spread of the disease. This seems an extreme measure but risks and benefits should be dispassionately analyzed. To save the lives, honor and economic future of Pakistan in general and Pushtuns in particular even painful and extreme options need careful analysis. Surprisingly, a large number of people especially Pushtuns from various backgrounds have come around to this conclusion. I personally know many of them who have not even killed a chicken for personal consumption but after seeing the brutalities of extremists they are now of the view that to save the future of their coming generations some drastic measures are urgently needed.
- Even those who are not supporting military operations have candidly expressed the view that extremist leadership needs to be liquidated to remove the cloud of fear hanging over the head of general public.
- Human life is sacred and taking a human life is a serious business. It puts a heavy weight on the mind, heart and soul of anyone who has to make this painful decision. An institutional process to look into this matter may be a cumbersome but better option than individual decision. Israeli model may be something to look into. In Israel, state sponsored assassination is secret but authorized at the highest level with intelligence agencies providing basic information and then judicial branch providing legal base followed by final decision by political leadership. Regardless of which option is considered it is a painful task and needs careful analysis of all aspects.
- Another theme to ponder is 'not to put the lizard in your mouth. You will neither be able to swallow nor spit it out'. The question is whether first and second tier leaders of extremists who have owned their own treacherous and murderous deeds should be arrested and taken through the labyrinth of normal judiciary. Who will try them and who will be witness? In previous cases no witness has come forward to give testimony in anti-terrorist courts and many judges of these courts have been murdered. Are special judicial or military courts a viable option ? Is their crime so blatant to which they have confessed in their interviews without any pressure that guilt need not be further confirmed and sentencing phase should be the next step? These are all important questions which need serious discussion.
- If it is decided that some dogs need to be put to sleep then specialized hunter-killer teams of police, police constabulary, FC and army should be trained and put in operation with close supervision.
- Battle needs to be taken to the wolves' den and not waiting for them to come out and strike at their will.
- Current support for military operations should not be seen as a blank check. Public support will be neither unconditional nor perpetual. Military will need constant review of its operations to minimize unwanted side effects and keep public support and goodwill.
- There is lot of suspicion and hesitation on part of general public which is crucial in tribal areas. Tribesmen complain that they were encouraged to stand up to extremists but when they did, army after cutting deals with extremists left them to be devoured by demons. Extremists took a terrible toll brutally killing many and forcing remaining to flee. Another lesson, 'If you don't do it right first time, more blood and treasure is wasted to correct mistakes and then do it right.' In the process you loose the vital asset which is population support. According to some counter-insurgency gurus, in fact the center of gravity in counterinsurgency is population. Army has to work overtime to convince tribesmen that this time they are playing for the win. Taking back Waziristan will the most difficult task and will need careful calculations. Extremist structure in other tribal agencies is not as well entrenched as in North & South Waziristan.
- Operating in one's own area is not an easy job and all aspects need careful attention and constant revision. Units which are being deployed should be thoroughly briefed that they are not operating in a hostile territory but to selectively root out extremists. It is quite natural that soldiers will be emotional and angry where their comrades are killed and injured. They will perceive the whole area as hostile. Officers of all ranks from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant General need to keep their own cool and have to constantly engage their men to reinforce the message. It will be a tragedy that after so much sacrifice, army looses the goodwill of the population.
- Small groups of male members from IDP camps should be taken to their areas which are cleared by the army and relatively safe. They can tend to their crops and orchards under security and if area is calm for a while they will communicate with their family and friends thus encouraging early return of these IDPs at least to major towns.
- Military should constantly review their security paradigm in areas which have been cleared. Local population should be treated with respect. Security measures and what is required from civilians in terms of approach to a checkpoint or driving a vehicle should be announced periodically on local radio stations and posted at mosques or local gathering places.
Holistic View
'Courage among civilized peoples consists in a readiness to sacrifice oneself for the political community.' G.W. Hegel
Army leadership knows the limitations of such difficult operations and so far signs are encouraging that they are listening and treating others with some respect. I think now they know that they are in the same boat with other passengers and they will need civilian help to plug the holes in the boat. In a recent gathering at GHQ army chief, FC commandant, police officials and politicians of NWFP were sitting on the same table. They were forced to sit on the table together because all of them are in the gun sights of the militants. Members of army, FC, police, civilian bureaucracy and politicians have all been beheaded, shot and bombed by the militants. Mutual respect and trust will strengthen each party and ease the painful journey ahead. It was heartening to see two Major Generals pinning bravery medals on an indomitable police officer Hussain Badshah. He was Station House Officer of a police station in Swat. When 34 out of 40 policemen serving with him left for their homes, he refused to be cowed down by extremist's brutality and held on to his position under constant attack from all sides. Finally, he took all his remaining men along with all weapons through a gauntlet of fire to nearby FC picket which was in turn commanded by indomitable Subedar Fazal Karim. He was commanding a 42 men contingent of FC and fought for 20 days when he was completely surrounded until military broke the siege.
Way Forward
- Keep the united front. All passengers of the boat will float or sink together. Pakistan's nemesis is now extremist militancy which will bring nothing but blood and tears to the nation. This single point agenda should be the focus. It is for Pakistanis to decide what is best for them but one hope that they will stop playing the smoke and mirrors game to bring clarity to the discussion.
- May be a little bit more thinking and reflection rather than looking for grand conspiracies will help a lot. The demons are very much Pakistan's own and the exorcism will also be performed by Pakistanis themselves. It is a painful process but a necessary one to save the soul of the nation.
- It is ironic that those political forces which were always suspect in military's eyes for being soft on national security are now on the side of the army. Pakistan Peoples Party, Awami National Party and Muttahida Qaumi Movement are fully supporting army while military's traditional allies including right leaning religio-politcial parties are either sitting on the fence or actively rooting for the other party.
- Military should not be hindering allocation of resources to FC and police. This should be seen as a long term investment. A robust and effective police, constabulary and FC will markedly decrease the use of army for firefighting missions.
- Recent examples of joint operations increased morale among all LEAs. Joint operations involving regular troops, FC, frontier constabulary and police will increase comradeship and morale. You build a bond with men when you fight together and die together . Recent incident in Mardan was a good example of this approach. A security convoy of police and FC was hit by an IED injuring many. A special group of FC led by Major Asad rushed to the spot and chased the militants. In ensuing gun battle, policemen, FC personnel and army officers fought together and died together. Those who gave their lives included an ace army officer Captain Meraj Muhammad Khan ( a sword of honor winner cavalry officer who had volunteered to serve with FC), indomitable Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Fareed Hussain Bangash, Station House Officer (SHO) Sherullah Khan , Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) Hanan Khan and two constables; Laiq Shah & Nazir Khan. These six brave men and ace officers of police and army gave supreme sacrifice.
- Police was outgunned right from the start and this matter should be handled carefully. Those who left their posts under grave threats should not be penalized and allowed to fade away. Those who stood their ground under extreme circumstances should be acknowledged and all those policemen who remained at their posts should be given next rank. New recruits should be a delicate mix of locals and non-locals as well as some fit retired armed forces personnel.
- Police stations should be reconstructed and manned by police & Frontier Constabulary with good back up from FC. Troops should be moved out of secured areas as soon as possible and kept in cantonments nearby.
- Army needs to carefully review the planning for the 'day after' when major operations are concluded. It can be either a quick handover or a fairly long stay to completely clean the area. In my view a middle approach is the best, not hastily handing over to a demoralized police and at the same time not controlling everything for too long thus further atrophying the police and civil bureaucracy. After cleaning up an area, police and civilian bureaucracy should be attached to local army detachment where officers and lower ranks interact with each other on regular basis thus helping in better understanding. This will also provide quick assistance from army resources. If a local civilian administrator needs humanitarian assistance, army's logistics team can help. Similarly if a police post is seriously threatened then local police officer at the spot can call army back up quickly from his army liaison. This process needs to be decentralized to some extent to speed up the process and small things should not be stuck in the bureaucratic labyrinth.
- Civilians should also put their act together. It includes both government agencies and civil society. IDPs in camps are scared, hungry and fearful of their future. In coordination with civil society organizations, IDPs can be taught basic measures of hygiene, discipline etc. so that relief effort is smooth and quick. Policemen beating up old men in camps are not a pretty sight and efforts should be made to handle it differently.
- Even those who disagree with current military operations should be given patient hearing. Let the public decide whether they are on the right or wrong side of history. Political animals should be left to the electorate to deal with them in next elections. On any issue there can never be one hundred percent consensus. If majority approves a decision then it should be followed.
Deficits
'War is the great auditor of institutions'. Corelli Barnett
- Lack of intelligence - This is the single most important handicap of the troops which is due to variety of reasons. There is very little penetration of inner sanctum of the extremists by Pakistani intelligence apparatus. Main reason is that instead of a political insurgency movement core leadership consists of a band of lunatic fraternity which has drunk heavily from extremist religious doctrine making inroads very difficult. Even deeper reconnaissance for tactical intelligence was scaled back when four SSG soldiers (Captain Najam Riaz, Captain Junaid Khan, Naik Shahid Rasul & Lance Naik Shakeel) were captured by militants and later brutally murdered. Local intelligence from residents was also very limited as majority of the population fled the area and even those who remained behind kept their mouths shut for two reasons. First they had seen daily displays of headless bodies in the main square of the town and second they were not sure whether troops were coming for good or for another fire fighting mission and after the departure of troops they will be left to face the brutality of the militants.
- Air and artillery assets are used against hardened targets of militants. This is a double edged sword and while it softens enemy and decreases potential casualties of soldiers, it has the potential of causing significant collateral damage.
Way Forward
'It is not a question how much a man knows, but what use he can make of what he knows.' Josiah Gilbert Holland
- The process to overcome the crucial deficit of intelligence will take time but correct steps should be taken right now to have various sets of ears and eyes to keep wolves on the run. In short term, FC especially Swat Scouts soldiers and army intelligence soldiers should be sent to IDP camps as liaison and teachers to develop relationship with inhabitants of different areas. This will need a good homework to make an intelligence map of the area where crucial areas are picked up and then contact is made with residents of those areas in different IDP camps. This should be the foundation stone of this operation followed by long term presence when civilian apparatus (i.e. police and intelligence bureau) is put in place.
- Militants and their spokespersons are using cellular phones for their announcements, communiqués and interviews. This pathetic exercise should come to an end as soon as possible. If the necessary equipment is not in the kitty of intelligence outfits, it should be bought from whosoever is willing to sell be it U.S. ,U.K., Israel. Pay few dollars more and you should be able to get what you want. From now onwards, no leader, commander, spokesperson should be able to make more than three calls. The new rule should be that 'three phone calls and you are out'.
- As far as air and artillery use, there is no simple answer and each particular situation should be evaluated professionally and risks and benefits carefully analyzed. However, as a general rule the less use of these powerful instruments the better it is for overall operation.
Militant's Response:
"If you are desirous of obtaining a great name, of becoming the founder of a sect or establishment, be completely mad; but be sure that your madness corresponds with the turn and temper of your age. Have in your madness reason enough to guide your extravagances, and to not forget to be excessively opinionated and obstinate. It is certainly possible that you may get hanged; but if you escape hanging, you will have altars erected to you". Voltaire (1698-1778)
- Majority of first and second line commanders used their better sense to move out of the firing lane. Foot soldiers put up resistance in pockets but it was never a real threat.
- The mayhem was not completely chaotic but there was some sense in the madness. There is an old Chinese saying that 'if you want to scare the monkeys; kill the chicken'. SOS signals were sent to other branches of the franchise and there was some response. Suicide brigades went in action to downgrade the morale by targeting security convoys, police. This had limited impact therefore they went after soft targets including civilian areas, bazaars, hotels and even mosques. This is severely testing the national morale.
- Militants in other areas are watching Swat operations carefully and bracing for the coming showdown.
Way Forward
- It is normal at battalion level that adversary is ridiculed and demonized to increase the morale of soldiers. Similar theme directed at general public is an attempt to isolate the enemy and gather public support for government action. However, at strategic level adversary should never be ridiculed but thoroughly studied professionally devoid of emotions and rhetoric. Old Chinese strategist Tao Te Ching warned that "No disaster is greater than slighting the enemy; For slighting the enemy borders on the loss of one's treasures".
- Militants are well trained and motivated. When they choose to take a stand they fight tenaciously.
- Militants have not given any quarter and they expect that no quarter will be given to them.
- These fundamental traits of militants should always be kept in mind when planning to confront them.
- Militant commanders in Swat and surrounding areas will retreat both in tree jungles as well as concrete jungles of large cities and wait for their time.
- Intelligence will be crucial both in local area as well as large cities to identify and then quietly eliminate these top layers of commanders. This is the single most important step to remove the cloud of fear over the head of general population.
- The labyrinth of tribal politics is a tricky one and very complex. In case of North & South Waziristan, first step should be splitting various militant leaders and organizations. It is important to understand that when Baitullah became the 'big dog' of the neighborhood, lesser mortals reached a détente with him for pure survival. There is a long history of fratricidal wars between various commanders based on tribal politics & influence and resources. Many such as Haji Turkistan (member of Bhittani tribe), Qari Zainuddin (member of Mahsud tribe), Hafiz Gul Bahadur (Madda Khel clan of Utmanzai Wazir tribe) and Mullah Nazir (Kakakhel sub clan of Zalikhel clan of Ahmadzai Wazir tribe) didn't hug Baitullah out of love. They wanted to be invited to the dinner by Baitullah and not to be on the menu of Baitullah. If they see that storm is going to topple the ship of Baitullah, these rats will be the first one to jump the ship. Important thing to remember is that they may be dreaming of running the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan after the demise of Baitullah.
- Qari Zainuddin has shown his hostility towards Baitullah Mahsud but he does not have enough muscle to take Baitullah head on. He was recently assassinated after his anti-Baitullah diatribes. Turkistan has also started to sing like a canary denouncing Baitullah. Work should be done on all these commanders to at least keep them neutral during conflict with Baitullah. In dealing with this issue it should be crystal clear right from the start that purpose is not to replace red snake with green snake. They are all poisonous and color does not matter. Ultimate goal is elimination of all extremist groups. Anyone ready to tackle others groups should be clandestinely supported with money and weapons and then finally they in turn should be dispatched expeditiously at right moment so that all these extremists can have a great 'pow wow' in hell.
- Recent reports that some dissident commanders are allowed to recruit volunteers from settled areas adjacent to Waziristan to fight Baitullah is a bad strategy. They should be kept away from settled areas otherwise there is risk that military will loose trust of general public (if any still exists) because they will see that military again supporting some militants. Those who want to take on Baitullah should be given safe passage to Waziristan and kept clear of settled areas. They should be used for intelligence and driving Baitullah's forces towards selected 'killing fields' where a clean up operation is then conducted. This should be an 'equal opportunity' operation. All leaders should be tagged and killed through targeted missions preferably anonymously.
- It will be naïve to expect that some local tribal or militant players will take care of the menace of extremism for Pakistani state and society. The problem is too complex and state has to use various elements at its disposal to reverse this phenomenon. Local players may be pawns in this game but they can never be given the role of king makers. This will prove disastrous in the long run.
Payback Times
'In a divided country, when any man thinks himself injured, he applies to the head of his faction, who is obliged to assist him in seeking vengeance if he is to keep up his own reputation and interests, instead of discouraging violence.' Machiavelli
- Once army achieved decent success, there were signs of locals trying to organize themselves. In Kalam, armed locals confronted retreating militants to prevent their entrenchment in the area. In Dir, after a suicide blast inside a mosque, enraged locals attacked militant strongholds. In three days over 1500 armed locals were engaging militants in tough firefights and encircled the villages where militants were holed in. This should be taken to its logical end and locals should be allowed to finish it off. This will increase their morale and give them the confidence that they can confront extremists on their own home ground.
- This example will also encourage locals in other tribal agencies to organize.
Way Forward
- Current operations are in Pushtun areas therefore role of Pushtun officers and men in various aspects of the operation are crucial.
- The role of Pushtun soldiers should be increased in intelligence, coordination with local communities, quick acceptance of mistakes and proper compensation and interaction with IDPs.
- Pushtu speaking officers and men should be on the forefront of interaction with media.
- Sacrifices of Pushtun officers and men should be highlighted sending a message that these men are fighting for their own land to protect their communities from the menace of extremism.
- If armed locals are used to patrol their communities then this effort will need careful coordination. A small group of Pushtu speaking officers and men should be attached as liaison with locals to coordinate all efforts and avoid friendly fire incidents. After coordination with locals to make sure that civilians are out of harm way, liaison officers can help locals to encircle militant positions. Air assets can be then brought out against entrenched positions of the militants. Locals are then allowed to finish the job.
- Local armed civilians should be under local traditional leadership. Government should provide some arms and ammunition to locals and arrange for patrolling of their neighborhoods. Every effort should be made to avoid emergence of warlords. Long term view should be kept in mind while pursuing this policy. Effective communication with local communities should be maintained and mistakes of the past should be avoided. In the past, government encouraged locals to take on the militants but then left them to the brutality of militants. Local leadership who stood up to militants suffered the brunt of the vengeance where assassinations, beheadings, bombings of jirgas and mosques broke the back of local leadership. It will take some time before local communities get back on their feet.
Tough Choices
'Courage is of different kinds. The ferocity of animal, the bravado of the robber, the bravery due to a sense of honor or chivalry is not courage in the true sense…. Only the aim and the content of action give meaning to the feeling of 'fearlessness'.' G.W. Hegel
- Extremists have become an existential threat to Pakistan. These messengers of chaos and anarchy will bring nothing but blood and tears to the nation. If anyone thinks differently he doesn't need more education but serious help.
- Some very difficult and painful choices lay ahead for Pakistan in dealing with the lunatic fringe. Before going towards the dark side, a dispassionate analysis of the damage done by extremist to the state and society needs to be done by the strategic community and clearly communicated to general public. Most Pakistanis will not recognize their own towns and cities which have become garrisons. Nothing has remained sacred and the perfidy perpetrated by the lunatics in the name of religion has shaken the very soul of the nation leaving it bewildered and traumatized. Bazaars, shops, hotels, government buildings, houses and even places of worship have become targets taking violence to a level which has not been seen in Pakistan before. Physical and psychological wounds are pretty deep.
- Non-violent approaches are the best instruments but when they fail what should be done and how? This is the million dollar question facing Pakistanis. It is always preferable that state should control and use means of violence to secure its citizens. What if state does not perform this vital function? What are the consequences for this inaction? First and foremost, nature abhors vacuum and if state retreats the vacuum is filled by warlords, mercenaries, freebooters etc. Secondly, as general rule violence is never one way. It very quickly becomes two ways and frequently multidimensional. Extremists have so far had a free ride where they have used all kinds of violence liberally against everyone who crossed their path. Lack of response so far should not fool Pakistanis.
- The anger and hatred which is developing has not been gauged correctly by many. Those who have suffered at the hands of the extremists and whose comrades and loved ones have been killed in most brutal ways are burning with anger. It includes ordinary folks, tribesmen, tribal elders, policemen and clerics. Recently, locals in Kalam area of Swat and upper Dir paid back militants in the same currency killing a number of extremists. If government is unwilling or unable to tackle this difficult problem then there is a clear and present danger that other non-state actors will emerge on the scene. These new forces which will confront extremists will be ethnic and sectarian. Most likely new militias will be either extensions of current organizations such as Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in case of Karachi, new armed wings of traditional Pushtun political entities such as Awami National Party (ANP) and Pukhtun Khwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) and revival of moribund armed outfits of Shia and Barelvi school of thought or we may see totally new players especially among Pushtuns in both tribal and settled areas. Baloch nationalist element may get entangled in this sooner than later because part of Taliban country in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is right in their backyard.
Way Forward
- Two fundamental questions facing Pakistan are what should be done and how it should be done to roll back the extremist threat? All voices should be given patient hearing to find best solutions.
- Best option is to have government authority back in place even if takes some time. Locals should be the source of information and pinpointing potential targets and violent means should be exercised by government carefully and methodically.
- In short term, if locals are encouraged to confront militants, homework is necessary to prevent unnecessary slaughter, confusion resulting in friendly fire incidents and destabilization of areas in the long term due to emergence of local warlords. Mistakes of Afghanistan should not be replicated in Pakistan.
- In the war against extremism, public support is crucial but every effort should be made to avoid emergence of local warlords. If this is not constantly kept in mind, there is a clear and present danger of fragmentation of Pakistan in the footsteps of Afghanistan.
- Local protection forces should be under traditional local leadership and elders. Recent experiment where government sponsored local warlords such as Mullah Nazir in Waziristan and Haji Namdar and Mangal Bagh in Khyber became a nuisance on their own is not the way forward. The biggest casualty of such amateur measures was lost of public confidence. It confused the general public creating doubts about government's sincerity. Risks clearly outweighed any benefits from propping up some local thugs. In extreme cases if any such measure is needed in a particular locality it may be better to rent 'killer for hire' for specific job in return for adequate compensation. From days immemorial, tribal territories have produced 'professional snipers' for hire and locals have used them to eliminate adversaries to avoid vicious cycle of revenge killings. Some of these professionals charge a hefty sum per shot but very rarely they have to use second shot. This is the most cost effective way of eliminating top tier commanders of extremist outfits.
- There are no clearly defined boundaries of this conflict and a 'cordon sanitaire' can not be put in place to quarantine troubled areas. Battle lines go back all the way to cities, bazaars, hotels, schools and mosques.
- The battle is a long one which will need cooperation among different segments of government and society.
'Consider not only present but future discords … If one waits until they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable.' Machiavelli
Dr. Hamid Hussain is an independent analyst based in New York. For comments & critique coeusconsultant@optonline.net
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