Refusing to learn

Brian Cloughley

It is likely the tribes and sub-tribes of the Waziris and Mehsuds will continue their shaky alliance until it suits them to again indulge in inter-tribal mayhem, and in the meantime they will try to kill as many Pakistani soldiers as possible



A brilliant and distinguished former US ambassador, Charles W Freeman, gave a talk last month in Washington to a group of retired diplomats. His exposition was lucid, forceful and very much to the point. It was given in the context of intelligence which "provides the sensory apparatus of the state", but which in some circumstances "can fortify national denial and complacency, perpetuate blind spots [and] attribute our own hopes, fears and motivations to foreigners who do not share them."




Mr Freeman hit the spot with his observation about one of America's gravest imperfections: complacency and arrogant self-confidence. He identified what is probably the single most-disliked national characteristic when he spoke of foreigners objecting to the presumptuous conviction that if they are to be trusted or held in any regard it is essential that their attitudes be indistinguishable from those of Americans.




It is unfortunate that a major factor governing attitudes in the United States is profound lack of knowledge. As Mr Freeman observes, "Surveys show the average American to be supremely ignorant of the world beyond our shores. The 2,500 foreign correspondents fielded by the US press sixty years ago have dwindled to less than 200. Our media...show little if any commitment to journalistic fairness, balance, or depth...The TV news, which bears the same resemblance to news in print media as the funny papers do to serious reportage, long since became the primary source of information for the American public."




One does not, of course, expect US decision-makers to be "average Americans" who are "supremely ignorant" of world affairs because of reliance on rubbish purveyed by Fox News, but it seems that their rejection of common sense in international deliberations stems not from lack of knowledge, but selective acceptance of the information with which they are provided.




In the Obama administration, it may well be that this does not apply, and that decision-makers are not blinkered bigots who, in the Cheney-Rumsfeld tradition, first decide on a course of action and then manipulate intelligence to fit the aim. In the case of the disastrous war on Iraq, this was certainly the case - and not only in Washington, alas, because the egregious Tony Blair, the recent and unlamented prime minister of Britain, did exactly that when presented with evidence that in Washington "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy".




And one deeply worrying consequence of fixing intelligence to fit policy, as pointed out by Mr Freeman, is the US' "conflation of Al Qaeda with the Taliban". This was a dreadful blunder, and silly newspaper headlines and Fox News bites about "the Taliban/Al Qaeda" give the impression, whether on purpose or otherwise, that they are in some way a partnership, or even hierarchically linked.




While some Taliban leaders have indeed voiced support for Osama bin Laden, as might be expected on the basis that anyone who damages America is a friend of the moronic mullahs, this is far from indicating any nexus between them. But, as pointed out by Mr Freeman, the effects of US policy have been to spread anti-American terrorism further afield, and especially to Pakistan.




It may appear that Washington and Islamabad are singing from the same song sheet as regards terrorism, but the efforts of Pakistan to manoeuvre tribes into alliances aimed at neutralising such vermin as Baitullah Mehsud have often foundered on the rocks of US tactics.




One of Mehsud's many enemies was Maulvi Nazir of the Ahmedzai Wazirs who had killed a lot of Uzbek nasties in South Waziristan and was thus deemed to be helping Pakistan's security as well as ridding the world of 'guest militants' who crossed the border to attack international troops in Afghanistan. (His motives were not entirely devoid of self-interest, for various shady reasons, but that's neither here nor there in terms of realpolitik.)




He had an agreement, a non-aggression pact, to put it in plain terms, with the Pakistan Army, which was satisfied that it had at least one ally in the region, who would be badly needed when it eventually became practicable to launch a major military operation in South Waziristan (as distinct from the professionally commendable but necessarily limited action in 2007).




But the Americans wanted to keep on using their video game, the drone-fired missiles, to blitz FATA and kill everyone who they considered to be a "bad guy". This included targeting Maulvi Nazir, who decided that he could do without the attentions of drones and blamed Islamabad for letting the CIA have their little parties.




Nazir is no pussycat. He is almost as horrible as Mehsud, which is a pretty nasty thing to say about anyone, but his agreement not to actually join Mehsud was important. But when the missile attacks continued to be directed at him, Nazir decided he had had enough, and switched sides and joined a union with Mehsud, ostensibly against "the Americans".




He denies the alliance is against Pakistan, and claims that the three groups involved (including North Waziristan's Gul Bahadur, a worrying development) will not fight against the Pakistan Army; but who knows what will happen when the chips come down?




It is likely the tribes and sub-tribes of the Waziris and Mehsuds will continue their shaky alliance until it suits them to again indulge in inter-tribal mayhem, and in the meantime they will try to kill as many Pakistani soldiers as possible.




Mr Freeman's notes that "under military pressure from [America], the Pashtun tribes who straddle the border have for all practical purposes withdrawn the limited allegiance they had earlier granted to Kabul or Islamabad." And then he asks: "why do we not see it as in our interest to learn from foreign best practices in areas like this?"




Good question. And one that should be posed again when the Pakistan Army begins its ground operation in South Waziristan.




The writer can be found on the web at www.beecluff.com