India’s role in Afghanistan is encirclement of Pakistan'

Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti, Research Assistant, Observer Research Foundation, traveled to Pakistan earlier this month. He interviewed Maj Gen Athar Abbas, Director General, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) on the status of India-Pakistan relations, the turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. The interview took place at ISPR headquarters in Islamabad on October 8, 2009.

ORF: What is the Pakistan army's position on the Indo-Pak relations post 26/11?




Gen Athar Abbas: Can Pakistan, which is in such a mess, afford to open another front and jeopardise the very foundation of it's security? How can the State deliberately undermine its security by doing or allowing the Mumbai terror attack? We have our cup full of problems- internal security, effects of the turmoil in Afghanistan, NATO surge etc. Both the states do not exercise the kind of a control that could stop a group of 10 men from taking initiative on their own. There is no guarantee against terrorists groups attempting another Mumbai. We can keep blaming each other, it is a never ending game. Second, the Indian intransigence about resuming the dialogue process is not helping to defuse tensions either. It is making South Asia hostage to one incident. Should we remain hostage to a non-state group?




ORF: How do you read the situation in Afghanistan?




Gen Abbas: We don't want to control Afghanistan by sitting in Kabul. Afghanistan has historically never been controlled by one power sitting in Kabul. It is a very fragmented society and is controlled by warlords. The warlords remain passive when they get something from the centre. Can [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar and the Taliban, allegedly supported by the state of Pakistan through the security establishment, control Afghanistan by sitting in Kabul? If anyone is subscribing to this theory then he is ignorant about the history, geography and culture of Afghanistan.




The campaign in Afghanistan relies excessively on force, while the political process is beset with shortcomings. There has been a continuous denial of the due share of the largest ethnic group [Pashtuns] in the economy, polity and security of Afghanistan. How can one expect things to normalise when Pashtuns, who comprise 40 percent of the population, have only a five percent representation in the Afghan army. They have no control over the ministries that are basically occupied by the Northern Alliance members. Tajiks comprise 25 percent of the population and yet they have a 56 percent representation in the armed forces. All those who currently control Kabul -be it the foreign forces, Northern Alliance or the Panjshiris - have nothing to offer to the Pashtuns. Is this the right political approach on the part of the US to over-rely on the use of force? If the surge indeed takes place, more troops will again create an impression that disproportionate force is being used against the main ethnic group [Pashtuns].




ORF: What are your interests in Afghanistan?




Gen Abbas: You see, we have a problem on our eastern border, and we have valid reasons for our concerns - the history of unresolved political disputes, water being the latest; the growing Pakistan-specific offensive capability of the Indian military in the form of a very offensive doctrine, the validation of which is the continuous exercising of the Indian military formations and advance weapons procurements. What we don't want is a threat on our western border. We want a stable, friendly and peaceful Afghanistan. If this happens, not withstanding who ever controls Afghanistan, then our concerns are addressed.




We are concerned by an Indian over-involvement in Afghanistan. We see it as an encirclement move. What happens tomorrow if the American trainers are replaced by the Indian trainers? The leadership in Afghanistan is completely dominated by an India-friendly Northern Alliance. Northern Alliance's affiliation with India makes us very uncomfortable because we see in it a future two-front war scenario.




ORF: The Pakistani officials allege Indian involvement in FATA. Can you justify such claims?




Gen Abbas: I am not very confident about such claims as I don't have any inside knowledge of this. But the fact remains that when the State gets locked up in this kind of conflict, they see each other's vulnerabilities. You're not a good intelligence agency if you do not exploit these vulnerabilities. We see a vulnerability of ours in FATA and in Balochistan. And so we fear that India could be exploiting these vulnerabilities.






ORF: By turning a blind eye at the Haqqani faction in North Waziristan, one gets an impression that that Pakistan is in connivance with them.




Gen Abbas: Currently there are limits to what Pakistan can do for Afghanistan. As the Afghan government and NATO has admitted, they don't exercise control over 70 percent of their terrain, then what do you think will happen if the Haqqani group goes back to Afghanistan. If we take on all the tribal militias, including the Haqqani and the Waziri groups, and the US leaves Afghanistan tomorrow, then we will be left alone to face a tribal uprising. We do not want their short term gain to become our long term pain.




ORF: Could you explain the complexities of the upcoming operation in Waziristan?




Gen Abbas: There are seven agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which came into being in 1893. FATA is controlled by means of the Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR), which stands on four pillars - FCR (1901 onwards,) the Frontier Corps (FC) which is the main policing force, the Political Agent who uses the FC to implement the FCR and the tribal leader or the Malik. FCR relies on collective responsibility and collective reward. If one pillar falls, then the entire system collapses.




During the Afghan war against the Soviets [1980-1989] the first casualty was the Malik, who was replaced by the religious cleric. Traditionally the Malik would lead the tribe in offensive excursions as well as on defensive missions. The mullah had a very insignificant place in the tribal culture. What the Soviet War did was that it alleviated the position of the mullah. And it was not the Soviets but the Americans who converted the Afghan `freedom struggle` into a holy religious war. Somehow they got in their mind that it would create an atmosphere of more ferocity, would attract foreign fighters and it would give them an advantage in the power calculus. The motivation that would come along with the religious element would act as force multiplier. They brought religious literature from Nebraska and elsewhere in Pashto language. They encouraged the madrasas, pumped enormous money into the system and alleviated the status of mullah. By then Maliks had been left far back.




The US invasion of Afghanistan again agitated the tribes and motivated them to resist the occupation. The money is not coming from the West, it is coming from drugs trade, extortion, kidnapping, donations from the Gulf and out of our own charity systems. And again the religious leader has gained ascendancy. It benefits him when the area remains mobilised for violence. It is already a violent society, but when you give it the shape of an external threat, it helps you mobilise support.




We are there since 2001, we have conducted many operations. Whenever the present operation happens, [Pakistan Army launched Operation Rah-e-Nijat, the much awaited assault on South Waziristan, on October 16] it will be targeted against the Baitullah Mehsud faction. In 2007 he formed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and they have acknowledged their involvement in more than 80 percent of terrorist acts inside Pakistan. They also have the support of very fierce foreign militants - the Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs trainers and a sprinkling from North Africa. This is the centre of gravity of the Pakistan Taliban and has been identified as the enemy number one.




Since last year, we have conducted operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, and Khyber and now we have encircled South Waziristan. The State has been expelled out of the Mehsud areas for over two years now. They have taken all the forts, check posts, expelled the FC and have created a State of their own. For two months the military has blocked all entry and exit points. The strategy will be to crack the hardest nut, it will be a fierce fight. Aerial bombing is continuing. In-fighting between the various tribes is taking place. So why go early, why not wait and allow conditions to become more conducive.




The most crucial question is on which side the Mehsud tribe stands at the end of the day. A fair assumption is that they are fed up with the total lack of development, schools, health centres and a viable political process. They want economic activity to start. The youth of the area has not seen anything but violence for three decades. There is lack of everything. You name it and it is lacking - governance, for instance, and that is where we all have failed. We never brought development to FATA. But you cannot have the political process until you create space through military action.




The end we visualise is the control of the area which is in possession of Hakimullah Mehsud's group, and in the process kill as many as possible and flush out the rest. They will inevitably flow to neighbouring Orakzai and also Afghanistan. Owing to the difficult terrain, it is hard to completely seal the area. When we occupy these areas, it would radiate vibes around -when you have one badmash in the mohalla, and you have identified him as the bully and have taken care of him, consequently the other middle sized ones adjust their position. So we foresee this happening. You break the main network so the others realize that it will be futile to resist the changed reality.




ORF: Gains made by security forces in Swat are encouraging indeed. But, given that the operation was overdue for more than two years, experts cry foul about state complicity with the Taliban in the past two years.




Gen Abbas: This goes to show that the State can do when it gets serious. It was serious earlier also but sometimes the environment dictates certain decisions. At that time we had a problem of public support - at the local level the support was there, but at the national level, the scene was divided. But now there was over-whelming support for the military operation. Earlier, a series of misjudgments took us in the wrong direction.




In the first case, doubts arose over why the army let Mullah Fazlullah escape in the first place in 2007. The fact is that the army was ordered to withdraw to facilitate the elections in February 2008. You have to understand that the army lost 37 of its own. You don't lose officers and men when you are playing a double game. Secondly, in the second phase of the operation, the army ran into serious difficulties. After the 2009 peace deal between the government and the militants, the military withdrew; it was ordered to remain restricted to its camps and lost the liberty of action. The army units were restricted to the vicinity of their camps. The rest of the area was with the Taliban. So the entire area was divided among the Taliban and the army presence. This created an impression among the local population that the Taliban and the army were both ruling in connivance without realising that we were trying to work out a deal. The military was under the civilian government. The government wanted the military to remain restricted to the camps and not retaliate. This created the impression that the army and the Taliban were in league with each other. Sometimes, the locals approached us asking for help. But we could not go as the army was lacking in resources to make pickets etc which further added to the misconception.




ORF: What steps are being taken to reintegrate surrendered militants into society?




Gen Abbas: We present the militants to the police, the local councils and committees that we have formed. They decide on the category - white, grey or black. Those under the white category are let off after signing indemnity bonds in police stations. Those falling under the grey and black are taken to the courts. Reintegration is not the responsibility of the army. It is the civilian government's responsibility. We have made a rehabilitation centre for teenage suicide bombers to de-radicalise them. But this is at a very small stage. Reintegration of ex-combatants is the task of the civilian government and I'm afraid at the present it is a non starter. They have to do it on war footing.