Straight talk to the US

Syed Talat Hussain

The decision making process, starting from target selection to the pushing of the button, cannot be done without Pakistan's permission. The principle of cooperation being: "We are one, but on our territory we are the only one"



The signs of changing times are unmistakable. Even President Asif Ali Zardari's ghost-writers have found a spine. 'How to mend fences with Pakistan', which appeared under the president's name last Thursday (December 10, 2009) in the New York Times, bravely avoids showering praise on Washington. Instead, it reminds the Obama administration the often repeated, and just as often forgotten, lessons of bitter history. From the article's narrative, Pakistan comes across as a wounded victim of US duality: a country whose sacrifices for the free world are never recognised and whose legitimate security interests have been treated with utmost contempt by successive administrations.




Such reminders are useful. The US administration is in the process of laying down its Pakistan policy parameters. It has to be pointedly told the apprehensions and aspirations that shape Pakistan's policy posture. And if these are articulated in the name of President Zardari, who has a reputation of fawning more than frowning on all things made in the US, it is even better. Yet references to past betrayals do not form a well-drafted list of issues the US administration must be mindful of. Nor do references to past inconsistencies serve Pakistan's specific future concerns with regard to the mission President Obama has tasked his generals to perform.




So, what are some of Pakistan's legitimate concerns that Washington ought to learn by heart and not ignore and violate?




One relates to the physical presence of the US and international forces inside Pakistan. Except for those Special Forces that have been allowed to train counter-insurgency trainers, war-driven agendas in the shape of hot pursuit shall not be accepted. Not only shall these be resisted, but force may be used if necessary. Rejection of boots-on-ground also includes air-space violations that develop into a pattern. Odd incidents of helicopters buzzing over the unclearly marked border between Pakistan and Afghanistan might be tolerated with warnings. But if Pakistani villages straddling the porous border begin to be hit by the international and US forces in the name of punitive strikes against 'terrorists', that shall be construed hostile action.




Another redline is uncoordinated drone-attacks. In principle, no foreign force should be allowed to undertake any violent activity within Pakistani borders. Whether the drone can be seen with the naked eye or not is immaterial. As long as the impact and destruction is caused on Pakistan's soil, this would constitute a grave violation of sovereignty. Regrettably, General (retd) Pervez Musharraf's licentious cooperation with Washington had created a bad precedent. The present government has done little to change it. According to some reports, there have been nearly 48 drone attacks in 2009 alone. But now that drone attacks have been formerly introduced in the US surge doctrine, their nature too has changed. They have become an instrument to implement formal war goals. These strikes can no longer be seen as stand-alone efforts to deliver surgical blows against wanted persons. They can be particularly problematic if they are not coordinated with Pakistan, whose forces are deployed and spread all across the tribal belt and can be hit. Pakistan has to be a deliberate partner in all decisions about the use of drones inside the country's borders. The decision making process, starting from target selection to the pushing of the button, cannot be done without Pakistan's permission. The principle of cooperation being: "We are one, but on our territory we are the only one".




Yet another, and just important, issue is that of belligerent rhetoric and 'do more' or 'you do not do enough' type of trite formulations. Pakistan has had its share of bilge from different US quarters. From field commanders to top generals, from Congressmen to aid workers, everyone seems to have a line against Pakistan's 'hedging and stalling'. This speculative sport of second-guessing Pakistan's motives is often joined in by the US sidekicks, the UK for instance. The blame game has had a crippling effect on the morale of the solider and the Pakistani citizen alike, who have both shed precious blood to secure peace in this area.




Thanks to the information revolution, Pakistanis are smart enough to know the reality. Eight years on, the 43-country alliance, the mightiest international force to have been put together in recent memory, has nothing to show for itself. Far from being stable or prosperous, Afghanistan lies in ruins. It is threatened by the very menace the West wanted to keep it safe from: the Taliban. In these circumstances, a critique of Pakistan's performance sounds hypocritical. A moratorium on silly accusatory statements must form part of the list of redlines Washington has to be unequivocally communicated to. General Stanley McChrystal is big on Stratcom (strategic communication in war times; in other words, 'propaganda'). He should understand this demand well. It is not amusing that Pakistan is at once treated as part of the problem and part of the solution. Pakistan must extend full cooperation demanding full respect, which includes a gag order for those whose ignorance of the complexity of the problem in this region is surpassed only by their incompetence in tackling it.




Another element of Pakistan's bottom-line relates to covert activities on Pakistani soil. At one level, the government and military establishment's own laxity is to be blamed for the heightened profile of the US secret service inside Pakistan's territory. Regardless of how Hollywood might depict US spies, they are found in our midst on account of either our permission or permissiveness. This policy ought to be immediately changed. Others will claim a mile if we concede an inch; and in this instance we seem to have conceded more than an inch.




But at the same time the zeal with which the US is pushing the covert operation administration is worrying. This mandate should not be allowed to make Pakistan a staging ground for activities that go beyond normal diplomatic conduct. This is not Iraq. Nor is there any space for Camp Victory, housing and accommodating gun-carrying, non-diplomatic staff that operates at will and with impunity. Even the US Embassy in Pakistan is hyperactive, creating an impression of imperial duties being performed imperiously. However, like all embassies, they are carrying out their administration's orders. This policy outlook, which makes Pakistan look like an outpost of the US war, must change. As the US enters the decisive phase of starting the Obama brand of military operations in Afghanistan, it will learn new things on the field. In Pakistan, it must learn to treat a crucial ally with dignity and respect.




The writer is a leading Pakistani journalist