Time to work with Afghan warlords

By Gerard Russell

WARLORDS STILL dominate Afghanistan's government, but if President Hamid Karzai and his Western backers handle them right, they can be part of the solution. To achieve this, though, the international community must be more consistent and tougher in its approach.

Afghanistan's Western allies have often said that they want to see more technocrats in the Afghan government - people with policies and strategies, who can work well with donor agencies. But technocrats remain a minority in the government. Instead, Afghanistan is increasingly run by warlords, strong men from Afghanistan's past. Indeed, Karzai's two deputies - the avuncular Karim Khalili and the pugnacious, scowling Marshal Fahim - are both warlords.

Operating now mostly behind the scenes, warlords are the former leaders of armed groups that formed the backbone of resistance to the Soviets and the Taliban. These groups are also collectively accused of committing widespread and shocking human rights abuses, though they were exempted from punishment in Afghanistan by an amnesty law in 2007. Their leaders routinely have Karzai's ear; his Cabinet was delayed while he negotiated it with them.

Their influence reflects an underlying reality: in a contest for loyalties since 2001, these armed groups and the warlords that lead them have proven themselves stronger than the government. The Afghan leadership itself recognizes this. When Karzai wanted votes in the election, he turned to the warlords and reached an accommodation with them. He turned to his ally Fahim for the security of his own compound.

The truth is that the non-warlords in the Afghan government, including Karzai, have not lived up to expectations. In the cases where warlords have left the picture altogether, the Taliban has often filled the gap; the government has appeared unable to impress, recruit and pay the right people to run the government.

When it was rumored that Karzai would be choosing Fahim as his running mate, I tried to lobby against it. I knew many Afghans who were dismayed at the resurgence of these figures from a murkier past - some had suffered directly at their hands. But that fight has now been lost. The international community has failed so far to undercut the warlords, and its chances of doing so will steadily reduce as the Afghan government grows in self-confidence.

Our hope must instead be that, rather than attempting to make good leaders strong, we can succeed better in making strong leaders good. Unlike a weak leader who can always say that the problems are not his fault, a self-proclaimed strong man has to accept responsibility for what happens on his watch. The right kind of incentives and deterrents have drawn some of Afghanistan's traditional strongmen onto paths of gradually improving behavior. Gul Agha Sherzai, the governor of Nangarhar, gets more plaudits for his energy and effectiveness than he does accusations of murder and drug-smuggling.

So we should not be surprised at the increasingly overt dominance of warlords. Western governments should engage them, but with a high degree of transparency, consistency, and conditionality. A first step is to determine which ones show potential for long-term reform, and which ones are incorrigible.

A second step could be modeled on the initiative already in place to reward reductions in opium cultivation, for which provincial governors are given substantial extra money to spend in their own provinces. Targets for improving human rights and security could be rewarded financially. Ministries that deliver results should be rewarded - no matter who is in charge of them.

For those who show no inclination to reform themselves, there should be consequences. Ideally Karzai himself would see to this, but if he does not, donors can withdraw funding from the provinces they govern or the ministries they run. Those who continue to be involved in major crimes should be denounced and the subjects of international arrest warrants. Afghanistan is a signatory to the International Criminal Court and no internal Afghan machinations can annul its verdicts.

Gerard Russell is a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.