Obama’s Afghanistan Troop Surge Misses the Point

A New Strategy for Focusing on Al Qaeda by Tyler Moselle

President Obama has recently decided to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, forces General Stanley McChrystal requested to carry out what he deemed necessary for an effective counterinsurgency campaign. His request is predicated on the assumption that it is necessary to defeat the Neo-Taliban insurgency in order to prevent them from taking over the country and providing a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. However, bin Laden and Al Qaeda, not the Taliban, attacked America on 9/11.

Afghanistan and the Troop Surge Request

The current debate over troop increases in Afghanistan based on the recent strategic assessment from McChrystal misunderstands the national security threat of bin Laden and Al Qaeda. This counterinsurgency strategy presupposes that the Afghan population needs to be protected, that the United States should prop up the Karzai regime, and that the insurgency is a direct threat to American interests; however, each of these assumptions are false.

There is no clear evidence that American and NATO forces actually protect the Afghan population from violence. In fact, foreign troop presence in the country near towns and individuals increases the likelihood that the Taliban will target those same people for providing information to the "infidel occupation forces." Afghans fear the Taliban, foreign militaries, and predatory Afghan police in nearly equal measure.

Why should the United States prop up Karzai by spending money and sending soldiers to the country to defeat the Taliban? The recent elections revealed corruption at the highest levels of the Afghan government. Obama's Administration has stated that Karzai must root out cronyism and corruption in order to continue to receive foreign aid. Secretary Clinton's recent visit underscored Obama's emphasis on not supporting a corrupt government. While these actions are steps in the right direction, there is no short-term guarantee that Karzai will be able, even if he sincerely tries, to root out corruption in the Afghan political system. McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy hinges on a legitimate government, yet Karzai is viewed as illegitimate and corrupt by many Afghans.

Some argue that if the United States does not defeat the Taliban, they will likely take over the country as they did in the 1990s and provide safe-haven to terrorist groups. However, there is no clear evidence the Taliban have enough power and support to do so. Even if the Taliban were able to control large parts of Afghanistan, the United States could carry out drone strikes and Special Forces raids against training camps and leadership. The current situation is not comparable to the US counter-terrorism strategy of the 1990s when the CIA and US military had minimal presence in Afghanistan; the CIA and US military did not have predator strike capabilities in the 1990s nor the high-level political willingness to strike at Al Qaeda leaders and camps.

Humanitarians may counter that the United States should not allow even parts of Afghanistan to fall to the hands of the Taliban for the sake of women, education, and religious pluralism. The fact is, however, that the United States cannot completely defeat or eradicate the deeply entrenched presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan with a short-term campaign. It is unrealistic that even with 60,000 more US soldiers deployed that America will be able to prop up the Afghan government. Peace and stability in Afghanistan require political negotiations with the Taliban and sustained humanitarian development.

Many argue that the Taliban cannot or should not be negotiated with, that there is a core of Taliban leaders who will not be persuaded to support a non-Islamic regime. However, there is another ring of leaders who can be bargained with and chipped away from the radical core that would support a power-sharing deal with the Afghan government. These break away leaders need to be protected and grafted into the political system. The low-level recruits can also be persuaded with money. Ultimately, Pakistan's ISI and elements of Saudi Arabia could be brought in to facilitate a deal. If critics counter the Taliban should not be negotiated with because they will not compromise on religious or women's rights, then those individuals must delineate a long-term plan for defeating the Taliban and the conservative Islamist worldview they represent. Two more years with increased American forces will hardly solve such a problem-and the United States is not in the financial position to fund a longer occupation of the country.

The Current Debate

Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were the original threats to American national security. Al Qaeda is a transnational terrorist movement that recruits and inspires individuals around the world in a decentralized fashion. Al Qaeda is not solely located in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda affiliates can be found in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Philippines, Sudan, Indonesia, various countries in Europe and the United States. As America cannot militarily occupy all the countries where Al Qaeda cells may be hiding, President Obama must create a new strategy that turns away from conventional military force. If the goal is to destroy Al Qaeda, then Obama must create a strategy geared toward capturing or killing individuals and cells in multiple countries. Such a robust strategy would likely be led by an expanded intelligence and Special Forces community.

The current debate about troop increases lacks a focused rationale. Al Qaeda and bin Laden should be the first priority of President Obama's decision-making process. Insurgency and stability in Afghanistan should be a secondary consideration. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency doctrine has been so engrained in the highest echelons of the US national security community, it is treated as a panacea for even global terrorism. This is both wrong and counterproductive; by focusing so intensely on the Taliban in Afghanistan and the attendant troop surge request, we are overlooking more effective policies and leading America into a strategically compromised situation.

Tyler Moselle is the former Acting Executive Director for Harvard Kennedy School's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, where he helped establish the State-building and Human Rights in Afghanistan and Pakistan Program with Carr Center Director Rory Stewart. He has published a variety of papers on counterinsurgency and Afghanistan.