Ghost of an accord

By A.G. Noorani

The ghost of the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah accord in February 1975 haunts Islamabad and Srinagar and is welcomed in New Delhi. In each place, though a sense of realism keeps intruding, the ghost continues to stalk. Now, 35 years later it deserves a well-deserved burial, however belatedly.

Kashmiri groups and politicians are hopelessly divided. A place for them in a tripartite conference will make it a new Tower of Babel. - AFP

Tragic events are, over time, laden with warnings unsupported by the facts. Munich and Pearl Harbour influenced the West's policies towards the Soviet Union despite its military superiority. Fears of a surprise attack (Pearl Harbour) and 'appeasement' (Munich) stymied diplomacy.




Pakistan's recent warnings against a deal between Kashmiri politicians and New Delhi reflect its fears of a repeat of the Gandhi-Sheikh accord, finalised in an exchange of letters on Feb 11-12, 1975, Sheikh sahib was appointed chief minister of the State of Jammu & Kashmir on the strength of her party's majority in the assembly. Niggardly concessions on autonomy were made to him.




Kashmiris, now more assertive than ever before, fear that some of them might tread the same path. New Delhi would have liked such a consummation but it knows better. Sheikh Abdullah was unique. There is not one Kashmiri leader today who can conclude such a deal whether among the unionists, separatists or the militant groups. Who then can make the dreaded deal? None.




The last two decades have made the Kashmir question a live issue which cries for a resolution based on an accord between India and Pakistan which is acceptable also to Kashmiri leaders on both sides of the divide. Recent years have witnessed changes which have gone unnoticed because they run contrary to the comfortable notions of old.




It is not only the separatists but also the unionists who demand a settlement with Pakistan. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and Farooq Abdullah, the patron of their party, the National Conference (NC), have repeatedly urged resumption of the dialogue with Pakistan and, specifically, the peace process aimed at a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.




The sentiment is shared by the rank and file. Ali Mohammad Sagar, member of the state cabinet, is not a figure of great significance but the plea he made at Shopian on Jan 31 reflects the change. "Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister P. Chidambaram should take some measures for resumption of a result-oriented dialogue process with Pakistan. They should give an impetus to the peace process." This from a party which, once upon a time, frowned on such efforts.




Even more strident are the leaders of the People's Democratic Party (PDP); its patron Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and its president Mehbooba Mufti. The PDP emphasises that, unlike the NC's proposal for autonomy, its proposal for 'self-rule' has an external component-link with Pakistan. It advocates dual currency in the state, Indian and Pakistani.




New Delhi is too alive to the political situation to imagine that a deal with any Kashmiri group, party or cluster of politicians can achieve peace in the state. Kashmiri groups and politicians are hopelessly divided. A place for them in a tripartite conference will make it a new Tower of Babel. Peace will come only by a settlement with Pakistan, albeit on terms which both can persuade the Kashmiris to accept.




Since 2004, India has been negotiating with Pakistan on the substance of the dispute, not procedures for its solution as in the failed Agra summit in 2001. The Bharatiya Janata Party has been wildly screaming at this shift. No one bothers to contest that Kashmir is a dispute, or that Pakistan is a party to it or that the views of the people are irrelevant.




India has learned from Indira Gandhi's mistake in 1972, after the Shimla agreement. Its last para 6 read thus: "Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations".




Three features stand out. The parties were committed to hold another summit as part of the Shimla process ('again'). Preparations for it were to be made by their representatives. A final settlement of the Kashmir problem had the same urgency as resumption of diplomatic relations. The summit was never held. Indira Gandhi's principal secretary and a trusted adviser, P.N. Dhar, explains in his memoirs Indira Gandhi, the Emergency and Indian Democracy why another summit was avoided.




He cites unconvincingly a couple of circumstances which had vitiated the 'atmosphere' only to reveal the real consideration. "It was necessary to resolve the differences with Sheikh Abdullah before taking on Bhutto again", adding "but it took longer than expected to arrive at an accord with him".




All of the second half of 1972 Z.A. Bhutto was urging Indira Gandhi to meet at another summit. He revived the proposal in 1974 through Sirimavo Bandaranaike, prime minister of Sri Lanka, P.N. Dhar records. Sheikh sahib made the same proposal in a letter to Indira Gandhi on May 24, 1976.




Why did he make this move only a year after his accord with her? Because he well knew that no agreement on Kashmir's future between India and Kashmiri leaders would work unless Pakistan was also a party to it.




In 1953 he advocated just this but was sacked from the office of prime minister of the state and put in prison for 11 years (1953-64), barring a brief interval in 1958. Interned from 1965 to 1967, he found on his release in early 1968 a situation worsened by the war of 1965. The war of 1971 aggravated it. In 1975 he had no cards to play. But the accord triggered militancy. Some groups of today were set up in prison.The situation in 2010 is radically different. Neither the ghosts of 1975 nor the shop-soiled slogans of old should impede the peace process which bids fair to be resumed if all goes well in the current parleys. The progress registered in the talks in the last five years is not something to be scoffed at.




The writer is an author and a lawyer.