By Shamshad Ahmad
India and Pakistan are set to resume foreign secretaries-level talks next week. It took eight months for India to act upon the understanding reached between the prime ministers of the two countries at Sharm el-Sheikh last June. In their joint statement, the two leaders had recognised that "dialogue was the only way forward and action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed."
The two prime ministers also agreed in Sharm el-Sheikh that "terrorism is the main threat to both countries" and that their governments were resolved "to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end." If this was the intent, the two countries, instead of linking the "composite dialogue" to "action on terrorism," should have reinforced their mutual cooperation in counter-terrorism, for which they already have bilateral as well as regional mechanisms.
A blame-game in public is the last thing the two countries should be engaging in as an instrument of their diplomacy. It is also immaterial how and why India changed its mind. It is also not important if the US played the decisive role in bringing India back to the conference table. It also makes no difference what nomenclature we use for the resumed dialogue. In fact, the term "composite dialogue" was introduced by India in June 1997, which Pakistan grudgingly accepted not to let the substance of dialogue get eroded.
One hopes the forthcoming talks in Delhi will bring some sanity back to the peace process which in recent years has been under assault from the enemies of peace between the two nuclear-capable neighbours. If Mumbai was an attempt to disrupt the India-Pakistan peace process, the ideal response would have been to frustrate this attempt by accelerating the process and strengthening mutual anti-terror cooperation.
Indeed, the India-Pakistan peace process has never been immune to domestic and external factors and has always been vulnerable to occasional hiccups. We have seen that whenever the dialogue process appeared to be making headway, some bizarre incident always took place, derailing and then stalling the process. These glitches have often become speed-breakers, if not roadblocks, in the process. While every effort now needs to be made to remove these glitches, one must not have unrealistic expectations from the Delhi talks.
It might be an opportunity for both sides to review their behavioural balance sheet since they broke off the dialogue process in July 2008, and to retune their negotiating templates. They must adhere to the existing India-Pakistan agenda and the structured framework of principles in dealing with this agenda which has been the basis of their peace process for more than a decade, and in which they have already covered considerable ground in terms of confidence-building measures, especially those relating to facilitation of the Kashmiri people's travel across the Line of Control.
While both sides should be amenable to make appropriate additions or modifications in their existing agenda, any effort by India now to redefine the agenda or constrict the list of outstanding issues must be resisted by Pakistan. "Talks for the sake of talks" must not be the option for Pakistan. We must insist on building on the ground already covered in the India-Pakistan "composite dialogue" since it began in June 1997. If India is adamant in its "unifocal" approach, Pakistan would be better off without dialogue at this stage and should wait for better times. Given past experience, there is no room for over-optimism in the India-Pakistan context simply on the basis of one or two bilateral meetings. This process requires perseverance.
Both countries will need to be sincere in giving peace a real chance. If possible, they should continue their dialogue process in an integrated manner as an uninterruptible process to build up trust and confidence, and develop mutually beneficial cooperation, including that in countering terrorism through existing bilateral and regional mechanisms.
Steady improvement of their relations requires not only confidence-building measures but also progress in conflict resolution, which should be visible to the people on both sides, particularly on the doables. The areas in which some forward movement can be expected include issue of peace and security, CBMs, Siachen, Sir Creek, the water issue, economic and commercial cooperation, the Iranian gas pipeline, promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, visa liberalisation and counter-terrorism.
Significant progress in these areas could set in motion an irreversible process of genuine India-Pakistan detente which would not only reinforce the constituencies of peace in both countries but also promote an atmosphere conducive to future progress on major issues including Kashmir. In recent years, both sides have been claiming "flexibility of approach and sincerity of commitment" but the momentum of normalisation will be difficult to sustain in the absence of sincerity on both sides.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the success of this process would depend entirely on the freshness of political approach that both sides would themselves be ready to bring in with sincerity and seriousness of purpose. The people in both countries have suffered for too long as a result of continuing tensions and conflicts and would welcome any new innovative approach that facilitates a "practical and achievable" solution of the Kashmir issue in keeping with the legitimate interests of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people.
India and Pakistan must develop a clearer framework of principles on the basis of which to address their outstanding issues and organise their future relations. For this purpose, regular agenda-specific and result-focused contacts between the political leadership of the two countries would be needed. There has to be visible progress at least in some areas.
The silver lining today is that after nearly a decade we in Pakistan now have an elected civilian set-up, and the two major parties are publicly known to be committed to a just and honourable peace with India on the basis of a negotiated settlement of the outstanding disputes. Their commitment to peace with India is reinforced by a political consensus reflected in their electoral manifestos.
History bears witness to the fact that India-Pakistan relations always saw better times whenever Pakistan had an "authentic" civilian government. Major India-Pakistan agreements were invariably reached only when civilians were in charge in Pakistan.
These included the Nehru-Liaquat pact in the 50s, the Shimla Agreement between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972, the Islamabad Agreement of June 23, 1997, laying down the basis and framework of the structured India-Pakistan composite dialogue, and the Lahore Declaration of Feb 21, 1999, both during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's last tenure.
The challenge for the leaderships in both countries now is to return to the genuine peace process envisaged in the historic Lahore Declaration in which India and Pakistan solemnly recognised that "an environment of peace and security" was in their supreme national interest and the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, was essential for this purpose.
In any case, the task ahead is not going to be easy, given the complexity of the issues involved. There will be no quick fixes, and we should be ready for a long-drawn-out process which must not be interrupted by change of governments or personalities, nor should it be subjected to the vagaries of domestic politics.
It is also time a serious appraisal was made of the policy options available to the regional as well as global stakeholders in making South Asia a factor of stability for global peace and security. This no doubt presents a challenge to the world community, especially the powers that matter, to explore the pathways to bringing the prevailing India-Pakistan logjam to an end through conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the modalities prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations.
The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: shamshad1941@yahoo.com
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